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It is a simple truism that the validity and significance of
psychological questions are largely determined by the theoretical
bias of the observer. Occasionally, however, there arise issues that
survive misperception and misunderstanding to challenge the logical
structure and comprehensiveness of all conceptual frames of reference.
Floyd Allport surely had these thoughts in mind when he characterized
the subject of this dissertation in these eloquent terms:
Meaning, a concept born under the malediction
of introspectionists, bandied about by philosophers,
overformalized by configurationists, disguised by
be'naviorists who could not afford to disown it, has
long been a neglected stepchild in psychology. Or
perhaps it is like Cinderella, a ragged waif compelled
by those who are ignorant of its identity to carry the
burden of their theories without recognition until
such time as it can be touched by an understanding
that will reveal its true nature and illuminate the
systems it has been compelled to serve.
(1, P-575)
Although Allport's comments are directed principally to general
psychologists, they have considerable relevance for theorists working
in the field of personality. Those psychologists who favour the
idiographic approach have tended to lean heavily on the construct of
meaning without attempting to define precisely what they mean by this
term. In a sense, this lack of specification is understandable since
it is their very insistence on the complexity of such constructs as
meaning that has led these psychologists to reject or doubt the value
of highly formalized systems in this field. Advocates of the nomothetic
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position have taken the opposite view, preferring to avoid the use of
variables that do not lend themselves to dimensional analysis within
the rubric of a quantitative frame of reference. However, as Allport
implies, one cannot dismiss meaning by theoretical sanction and then
re-introduce it in a disguised form. It is a well-known fact that the
responses given to items on personality questionnaires are partially
determined by their particular wording. Eysenck (18, p. 291) provides
a number of good examples of this in "objective" tests of prejudice.
He does not, however, get to the root of the problem which is quite
simply that until we have a satisfactory account of the nature of meaning
we will be left guessing as to the precise relationship between a stimulus
and the response it evokes, no matter whether the stimulus is as unstruc¬
tured as an ink-blot, or as "structured" as a written question.
If it were possible to define meaning in such a way that it could
be quantified with minimum loss of information on its idiosyncratic
aspects, the idiographically inclined might be saved the embarrassment
of being accused,of pure subjectivism, while the quantitatively oriented
theorist might be a little more willing to recognize the essential unique¬
ness of the individual.
The most promising means of effecting this compromise would appear
to involve some kind of multivariate analysis. As Cattell has observed:
The clinician is generally a multivariate experimenter,
who abstracts laws and concepts from observing ("globally"
or by "gestalts" as he might say) simultaneous changes in
a large number of uncontrolled variables... but without the
benefit of precise instrumental measurements or explicit
correlational procedures.
(7, p.261)
Assuming that the clinician would agree with Cattell's contention,
we would nevertheless expect him to demand that the parameters of meaning
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bear a fairly clear affinity with his own subjective impressions. Fur¬
thermore, he would certainly require that the number of parameters and
the units of measurement be such as to permit maximum discriminations
among meanings within and between individuals.
No personality theorist has so far addressed himself to this
problem. Quite recently, however, Charles Osgood, a neo-Behaviourists,
proposed (52, 53) a general model of behaviour in which meaning is
treated as the most important aspect of learning. Osgood's approach
should be of considerable interest to personality theorists since he is
primarily concerned with meaning in language - or to be more precise -
with the circumstances that determine how a word, which is initially of
a purely arbitrary nature, becomes a sign of something else. This
problem is faced by every theorist who employs language as a mediator
for the reflection and identification of other psychological variables.
As such, it is a problem that is written into every method from the case-
history to factor-analysis.
In collaboration with George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum, Osgood
(54) has also published an account of the Semantic Differential, an
instrument that purports to measure the connotative meaning of words.
This instrument consists of a variable number of bi-polar adjectival
scales that are assumed to be representative of the major dimensions
along which meaningful judgments can vary. These psychologists maintain,
among other things, that the Semantic Differential permits not only quan¬
titative comparisons between groups, but by virtue of its flexibility,
offers a maximum degree of freedom for recording highly personal meanings.
Unlike the great majority of quantitative approaches to personality
assessment, it is not a standardized test.
Two rationales are offered for the Semantic Differential. The
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first rationale comprises a purely operational definition of meaning that
is expressed in terms of the numerical values assigned to the sequence of
verbal quantifiers that index direction and intensity of ratings on the
adjectival scales. The second rationale assumes an isomorphic relation¬
ship between the characteristics of meaning as defined within Osgood's
neo-Behaviouristic model and the direction and intensity of ratings on
the Semantic Differential.
This dissertation represents an attempt to test the validity of
the second of the two rationales, and to determine the possible value of
the Semantic Differential as a research tool in comparative studies of
different clinical groups. To permit a comprehensible statement of the
hypotheses, it will be necessary to outline the historical background
against which Osgood's approach to meaning and its measurement are set.
Since there is already a voluminous leterature on the subject of meaning,
the preliminary discussion will be limited to a consideration of two
questions. The first concerns what psychologists have had to say about
the circumstances that determine the acquisition of word-meaning. The
second question concerns previous attempts to index word-meaning. This
discussion will be followed by a presentation of Osgood's theory and a
description of the Semantic Differential. This will conclude Part I of
the dissertation. Part II will comprise reports of the three studies that
form the core of the work. In Part III an attempt will be made to draw the
various findings together within the context of a general concluding
discussion.
CHAPTER II
EARLY THEORIES OF WORD-MEANING
We may begin with the self-evident fact that words are quite
different from the objects or situations that are signified by them.
The word "fire", for example, in no way resembles the physical charac¬
teristics of flames and smoke. However, if someone were to shout "Fire!"
in a crowded theatre, it would be relatively easy to predict the general
reaction. It would be surprising if instead of attempting to escape,
the patrons started to fumble for change and look expectantly for the
ice-cream vendors. It seems reasonable to conclude therefore, that
there are associations between words and their objects and that these
associations are learned. The question of meaning concerns the nature
of these associations and the circumstances that determine their estab¬
lishment.
An examination of the history of psychology reveale a marked
reluctance on the part of the early scientific theorists to accept meaning
as a real problem. These men were preoccupied with describing mental
activities as they actually exist, and since meaning seemed to point away
from experience or behaviour to remote and vague ideas or acts, the
analysis of this concept seemed a rather fruitless enterprise. Nevertheless,
since the psychologists of the day were still being strongly influenced
by their philosophical predecessors (particularly the British Associat-
ionists), accounts of meaning were more or less de rigueur.
Titchener and Meaning
Titchaner (79, p.26ff) distinctly excludes meaning from the subject
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matter of psychology on the grounds that, as a science, psychology
should deal only with facts and not with their values, meanings and
uses. Meaning, he argues, is of a highly personal and subjective
character since one experience may have many meanings; several exper¬
iences may have a common meaning; meaning may be stripped from any
mental process by introspection; and finally, an entirely meaningless
process may acquire meaning.
From this point of view, only one question could be asked about
meaning, namely, what attributes of mental processes have the effect of
endowing them with meaning? Titchener answers as follows:
Meaning is always context; one mental process is
the meaning of another mental process if it is that
other's context. And context in this sense, is simply
the mental process which accrues to the given process
through the situation in which the organism finds
itself.
(78 p.367)
Mental processes, then, have no intrinsic meaning. They may
acquire extrinsic meaning through their association with other mental
processes. Titchener invokes the classical laws of association (simil¬
arity, contrast, frequency and contiquity) to explain how contextual
meaning is established.
This theory, as it stands, has nothing in common with the behavior-
istic tradition that developed in opposition to all forms of mentalism.
When, however, we examine Titchener's views on the origin of meaning, we
find a position that is remarkably similar to neo-Behaviouristic thinking.
For Titchener, meaning is initially a form of kinaesthetic sensation:
... the organism faces the situation by some
bodily attitude, and the characteristic sensations which
the attitude involves give meaning to the process that
stands at the conscious focus, are psychologically the
meaning of that process.
(77, p.176)
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In dealing with meaning in language, Titchener asserts (59,p.177)
that words are at first motor attitudes, gestures and kinaesthetic
contexts, together with the auditory stimulus characteristics that are
peculiar to speech. This total context is later expanded by the
acquisition of reading skills so that eventually the meaning of a word
may involve verbal images and their visual-kinaesthetic and auditory-
kinaesthetic concomitants. He then suggests that under certain circum¬
stances, word-meanings may not require conscious representation in the
form of ideas or images. Instead, meaning may be carried in purely
"physiological" terms. Titchener offers book-skimming and skilled
musical performances as examples of this phenomenon. He does not
explain meaning without awareness, and is apparently content with
stressing that its existence underlines rather than detracts from the
significance of conscious meaning.
In the light of his reluctance to discuss meaning, it is not
surprising to note that Titchener has nothing to say on the matter of
indexing this process. Indeed he believes that the success of the
introspective method depends on the elimination of meaning from the
reports of both the subject and the observer.
Watson and Meaning
Like Titchener, Watson is inclined to dismiss meaning as a
useless concept:
Exhaust the conception of action, i.e. experimen¬
tally determine all of the organized responses a given
object can call forth in a given individual, and you
have exhausted all possible meanings of that object
for that individual.
(85, p.365)
He specifically rejects Titchener's notion of meaning as context
and maintains (85, p.364) that to explain the meaning of one image or
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idea in terms of other associated ideas is to explain nothing. He
recognizes however that in excluding mental processes, meaningful and
otherwise, he is obliged to point out their equivalent in behaviour.
Since his alternative proposal re-introduces meaning in a somewhat
disguised form, a close examination is warranted.
For Watson, thought-processes are no more than the faint rein¬
statements of motor activities - particularly in the larynx (83, p.174).
The development of language is therefore crucial in the establishment of
the so-called highest forms of cognitive activity. Through conditioning,
motor responses to an object are learned by the young child. He is then
presented with stimuli that elicit responses of naming both the object
and the conditioned response. Each object then becomes a stimulus that
is capable of releasing either the non-language habits or the language
habits (84, p.329ff). 'The penultimate stage is reached when objects
evoke naming responses only, and language development is complete when
subsequent parts of a series of verbal responses can be initiated by
the introduction of appropriate stimuli at any antecedent point in the
series.
Watson does not specifically refer to meaning within the context
of this discussion, but in a later work we find the following:
Meanings are implicit (speech) responses
originally elicited by referents and then, through
conditioning, by words.
(85, P.97)
That this statement is rather more theoretically constructive than the
"sum-total" definition quoted earlier is borne out in a still later xrork
in which Watson describes how the meaning of "steep" is acquired. He
suggests (86, p.102) that "hill" objects are conditioned to explicit
and implicit responses of saying "steep". These responses produce
stimuli that are in turn conditioned to further verbal and motor
responses of saying and then executing hill-climbing movements. The
significance of this illustration is that it implies that the meaning
of the linguistic sign "hill" is not simply the sum of the responses
that are elicited by it, but an ordered sequence of responses. Within
this sequence there are implicit speech responses whose primary function
is to produce stimuli that mediate consequent behaviour. If Watson had
reserved the term "meaning" for such responses and then gone on to
develop the anticipatory function of meaning thus defined, there would
have been no need to introduce the term "neo-Behaviourism" into the
vocabulary of psychology. As will be seen presently, the only difference
between Behaviourism and neo-Behaviourism is that the latter school
places a much greater emphasis on mediating events between stimuli and
responses than does the former. An examination of Watson's general
theory of behaviour reveals that mediating events are invoked in the dire
emergency of having to account for the highly variable nature of instru¬
mental sequences over time. Having committed himself to a study of only
the observables in behavior, he is clearly on thin ice in respect to
response-produced stimuli. Furthermore, in failing to specify the nature
of the unconditioned stimuli with which response-produced stimuli must be
paired in the conditioning process, Watson leaves himself open to the
very criticisms he advances against the Structuralists.
Watson's theory of word-meaning was accepted more or less in toto
by his fellow-Behaviourists, but a number of refinements and extensions
are worthy of note. Dashiell (10) utilized the concept of inhibition to
explain the non-appearance of meaning-responses where they might have
been expected. Weiss (87, pp. 318-319) and Gray (26, pp. 65-72) provided
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a behaviour!stic interpretation of concept-formation. These psycholo¬
gists suggested that word concepts are developed by conditioning a
given verbal response to a variety of physically dissimilar but func¬
tionally equivalent objects or names of objects.
Watson's failure to distinguish between meaning as response and
meaning as mediating response has important implications for the
indexing of this variable. On the basis of his first definition, the
experimenter would apparently limit himself to the recording of all
responses elicited by a given word. The unprofitable nature of such an
enterprise would become immediately apparent when he finds that the same
verbal stimulus elicits synonyms and antonyms in addition to mutually
antagonistic muscle groups. If, however, he limited himself to mediating
responses, his task would become a little more meaningful, as it were,
but only at the price of running into severe methodological and theoretical
difficulties. This is in fact what happened.
Before the Behaviourists could demonstrate that meaning is an
implicit speech response, they first had to show that all mental activities
could be reduced to muscle-activity of one kind or another. There appeared
a spate of experiments designed to show that tongue, laryngeal movements
and other small muscle-groups are always present during thinking. The
initial experiments employed various devices for measuring mechanical
changes in muscle-tissues and were quite unsuccessful. The first positive
evidence came with the development of techniques for recording changes
in muscle potential. Both Jacobson (38) and Max (46, 47) reported rough
correlations between cognitive activity such as problem solving or imag¬
ining the raising of a limb, and bursts of muscle potential. It was
clear, however, that this evidence did not constitute grounds for rejecting
a centralist conception of thinking. An incidental finding of the Max
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investigations might have created the suspicion that thinking possibly
involves both peripheral and central processes. Max reported correla¬
tions ranging from -0.22 to -0.92 between scores on a number of intell¬
igence tests and average microvoltages from muscle contractions occurring
during problem-solving. The consistency of this trend indicates that the
more intelligent the subject, the less overt are his symbolic processes.
No evidence was adduced to suggest that there was a measurable
similarity between tongue-movement patterns and overt speech, and perhaps
because of this, experimental interest in a peripheralist approach to
human thinking petered out. The logical, step would have been to shelve
the theoretical controversy and pursue the lines of enquiry opened by Max.
This would have called for a programme of developmental and comparative
studies designed to examine the possible changes in overt muscular respon¬
ses as a function of time, task-complexity and intelligence level. Such
a programme might well have shed light not only on the nature of thinking
but on the development of meaning.
Thorndike and Meaning
The view that all learning could be explained on the basis of a
simple conditioning model was attacked by E. L. Thorndike. He argues
(72, pp.401-412) that conditioned response learning is characterized by
features that are not found in "ordinary" learning. In particular, he
noted that the establishment of conditioned responses demands highly
artificial laboratory controls and that the emphasis is placed on
stimulus substitution rather than on response modifiability.
In a summary of various theories concerning the origin of language,
Thorndike refers to the kind of model proposed by Watson as follows:
The ding-dong theory assumed a mystical power
of certain things to evoke certain sounds from men.
Since each sound was associated with the experience
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of the thing, it came to mean it... All the evidence
is against the existence of such a power.
(74, pp. 84-85)
Thorndike uncovered the major weakness of Watson's theory, namely
that for every vocalization made by the individual there must be a
corresponding unconditioned stimulus. If Watson had been faced with
this issue, he would have had to agree that a simple conditioning theory
of behaviour is inadequate.
Thorndike's own theory of word-meaning was not presented as one
complete statement and it is therefore necessary to tease out his views
from a number of his writings. He argues (74, p. 31 if) that in the
course of random vocalizations, the young child has the good fortune to
make a sound that is recognizably like some accepted word in the language-
culture. When this happens, he is rewarded by his mother or some other
person, and the probability of the sound's subsequent occurrence is grad¬
ually increased. Such sounds then become available for association with
objects, persons, or other words through the principle of "associative
shift". (73, p.404). According to this principle the stimulus that is
likely to evoke a particular vocalization is linked with some other
stimulus which, in the course of time will acquire the capacity to elicit
the vocalization without the contiguous presence of the original stimulus.
The meaning of a word is the connection between the word and a real exper¬
ience or verbal statement thereof. It is not, as Watson suggested, the
response elicited by the word. To illustrate this distinction, Thorndike
(73, p.371-375) draws on word association experiments in which a given
stimulus word such as "cold" may evoke such responses as "like ice", "snow",
"frozen" on the one hand, and "air", "cream" and"shoulder" on the other.
The first of these two groups of associations, Thorndike argues, reflect
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"meaning-connections" while the second group are merely habitual
sequences in speech or writing.
The notion of selective reinforcement constitutes an important
difference between Thorndike and Watson. The latter adopted a classical
conditioning model in which no provision is made for the establishment
of responses for which there are no readily identifiable stimuli (e.g.
vocalizations in early infancy). In effect, such a model is restricted
to a statement of the conditions under which a well-established response
may be elicited by a formerly neutral stimulus. In Thorndike1s scheme
the organism is merely presumed to be capable of emitting the desired
response which - when and if it appears - is then strengthened by reward
in primary reinforcement.'^
At first sight, the principle of associative shift seems to be
identical to classical conditioning. Thorndike however, made no less
than twelve distinctions between these two forms of learning (73, p.402ff).
The following four are worthy of note: (1) in associative shifting,
time relations are relatively unimportant in that the neutral stimulus
may be presented before, after or in simultaneous contiguity with the
operational stimulus; (2) unlike classical conditioning; associative
shifting normally requires that the neutral stimulus be introduced grad¬
ually with the presentation of the operational stimulus; (3) in ordinary
associative shifting, the role of reward is crucial whereas it is inci¬
dental to the establishment of conditioned responses; and (4) in
associative shifting, the new connection, once acquired is strengthened
by repetition and reward. Conditioned responses, on the other hand, may
•'•The distinction between the Watson and Thorndike models is
essentially analagous to that made by Skinner (48, pp.18-19,
238) between Type S (classical) and Type R (operant) conditioning.
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be extinguished at least temporarily by massed practice.
Thorndike does not commit himself to a description of the precise
nature of meaning-connections and contents himself with the flat assertion
that such connections or "associative tendencies" exist (73, p.373).
Eilgard (32, p. 18) maintains that Thorndike thinks of connections as
direct impulses to action and that he excludes ideas and consciousness
from his theory. However, when one asks the question as to what is
connected in meaning-connections, a mentalistic associationism is invoked
by Thorndike. Since this point is crucial it will be necessary to quote
him directly:
If a word is seen or heard ...these connections
constitutive of meaning are likely to operate. If
one or more of them do operate, the person will think
of some thing, quality, act, event or relation which
has frequently and fitly gone with the word or of some
verbal expression which gives it meaning.
(73, p.373)
This suggests that connections are formed not only between stimuli
and responses but also between stimuli and some mediation process. This
interpretation is supported by Thorndike's own notions concerning the con¬
sequences of such associations. The occurrence of meaning-connections
might lead to a response such as writing the name of the thing, quality,
act, event or relation. Alternatively, such connections may "proceed
further to some associated idea and its name" (73, p.373).
The principle of associative shifting is used by Thorndike to
strengthen the distinction between meaning - connections and habitual
sequences. The former consist of stimuli which are functionally inter¬
changeable in producing the same response or class of responses. Thus
the connection between the visual object, "bread" and the written word
"bread" is meaningful because both stimuli are associated with eating.
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Habitual sequences do not have this property. "Brown-bread" for example,
is a sequence that is composed of two words each of which is separately-
associated with discriminably different responses or response-classes.
In summary then, Thorndike contends that the origin of the child's
language lies in the selective reinforcement of spontaneous vocalizations.
Words acquire their meaning through associations with objects or other
words under the conditions of associative shifting. The test of simi¬
larity in meanings lies in whether or not words evoke common responses or
response-classes.
The greatest difficulty with this theory is that it raises more
questions than it answers. Thorndike's general theory of learning
involves the concept of a single-stage or direct connection between
stimulus and response situations. Such a connection, strictly speaking,
is a response-tendency. In his theory of meaning, however, connections
are not direct but involve the mediating properties of ideas, thoughts,
or representations. The "associative-tendency" or meaning-connect!on is
established between the initiating stimulus and the idea. Between the
latter and the terminal response there is still another connection which
is the response-tendency proper. The obvious question concerns the precise
nature of the mediating process. Thorndike provides no answer. Although
the principle of associative shift helps us to understand the conditions
which give meaning-connections their distinctive character, there is
clearly no suggestion that the mediating process is the (common) response
elicited by two stimuli.
The Transition to neo-Behaviourism - Hull
Although Clark L. Hull did not advance a theory of word-meaning he
laid the groundwork for the neo-Behaviouristic conception of meaning
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advanced by Osgood. In one of his earlier papers, Hull states:
A reflective consideration of the habit
mechanisms involved in anticipatory defence
reactions reveals a phenomenon of the greatest
significance. This is the existence of acts
whose sole function is to serve as stimuli for
other acts. We shall accordingly call them
pure stimulus acts.
(34, p.515)
Hull went on to argue that behaviour sequences involving the
production of pure stimulus acts had the greatest significance for
survival since the organism was thereby enabled, to react to "the not-here
and the not-now" (34, p.524). He concluded that the concept of the pure
stimulus act probably constituted the organic basis of symbolism.
The development of pure stimulus acts may be observed during
conditioning experiments. Hull noted that as the trials progress, reac¬
tions originally elicited at one point in the behaviour sequence appear
to move forward in that sequence in an anticipatory fashion. His explan¬
ation was that any stimulus that persists throughout the sequence will
become conditioned to all reactions in the sequence. However, since
associations formed between the stimulus and reactions occurring near the
terminal point of reinforcement are strengthened more rapidly, the occurr¬
ence of the same stimulus earlier in the sequence will tend to elicit these
later reactions in an antedating fashion. Hull stressed the point that
these reactions are not only conditioned to' "artificial" stimuli such as
a continuous buzzer sound but also to drive stimuli arising from tissue
needs.
The significance of antedating reactions does not lie so much in
the fact that they are reactions as in the fact that the stimuli produced
by their occurrence may mediate a variety of responses. In a classical
18
conditioning experiment, there -would be an obvious affinity between
mediating and terminal responses, but in instrumental or avoidance
conditioning, the pure stimulus act may mediate a conditioned response
that need bear no resemblance to the unconditioned response.
The concept of the pure stimulus act is not unlike Watson's notion
of the response-produced stimulus. Watson however thought of the response-
produced stimulus as the link between two or more different conditioned
reflexes. Hull's pure stimulus act is developed within a single condi¬
tioned reflex. This difference is illustrated in Figure 1. In Hull's
paradigm, the pure stimulus act antedates the conditional response.
CS^ > Pure Stimulus Act > CR^
CS^ * CRt > (Response-produced S _
(U.G.S. or CS2 > CR£
FIGURE 1.
THE CONDITIONING PARADIGMS OF WATSON AND HULL
The response-produced stimulus in Watson's model is produced by the con¬
ditioned response, and then becomes available as a conditioned stimulus
for CR2 by being made contiguous with an unconditioned stimulus or a
second conditioned stimulus.
Evidence for the pure stimulus act comes from studies by Culler (9),
Marcuse and Moore (45), Moore and Marcuse (51), and Liddell (44, p.189)
which demotistrated that certain components of the total unconditioned
response occur earlier than others in the course of conditioning. The
authors arrive at the common conclusion that the difference between the
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unconditioned and conditioned responses in all forms of conditioning is
attributable to the stimulation produced by the antedating reactions.
These studies also indicate that the antedating reactions are largely of
an autonomic nature but may include "light-weight" voluntary muscle con¬
tractions •
Hull did not develop fully the notion that pure stimulus acts
might constitute the origin of symbolic behaviour. It is, however,
central to Osgood's theory of meaning to which we may now address our¬
selves .
CHAPTER III
OSGOOD'S THEORY OF MEANING
Although Osgood deals exclusively with the nature of meaning in
The Measurement of Meaning (54), published in 1957, his ideas are best
understood in the context of a general theory of behaviour outlined by
him in two earlier works (52, 53).
He begins (52, p.75) by criticising the various types of S-S and
S-R theories for their failure to account for important behavioural
phenomena. While granting that the S-S model deals fairly adequately
with relations among sensory input events and between these and central
processes, Osgood maintains that the question of what happens between the
central processes and overt behaviour is scarcely touched. S-R theories
can at best explain simple relations between stimulus and response vari¬
ables, but have little or nothing to say about sensory integrations
(perceptions) or response integrations (motor-skills). Finally, neither
the S-S nor the S-R models have contributed much to our understanding of
symbolic processes.
The model Osgood (52, p.76) proposes is one which envisages two
stages and three levels of organization. The first stage, decoding, is
the total process whereby the physical energies of the environment are
interpreted by the organism. The second stage, encoding, is the total
process whereby the intentions of the organism are expressed. The three
levels of organization are (1) Projection which relates sensory and
motor events to the brain via innate neural mechanisms; (2) Integration
which organizes and sequences both incoming and outgoing neural events;
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and (3) Representation which is at once the terminal stage of decoding
and the initiation stage of encoding operations.
The Projaction level has two major characteristics. The first
takes the form of an isomorphic relationship between the receptor sur¬
face of the organism and the sensory cortex. This relationship also
holds between the motor cortex and the voluntary muscle system. The
clearest evidence for the isomorphism comes from neurological studies
that demonstrate a high degree of correspondence between direct electrical
stimulation of the sensory cortex and reported sensations and between
stimulation of the motor cortex and observed muscular contractions. The
second characteristic of organization at this level is that it is not
subject to modification through experience, i.e. the isomorphic relation¬
ships are unaffected by learning. Both characteristics enable us to
depend on stimulus and response observations as faithful indices of
sensory and motor signals.
From our everyday observations of behaviour, it is evident that
certain patterns and sequences of stimuli have precedence over others.
This also seems to hold for response patterns arid sequences. Osgood
suggests that sensory and motor signals must therefore be subject to
structure and organization. The concept of Integration is then invoked
to account for this organization. Borrowing directly from Hebb (30, p.62),
Osgood advances the following quasi-neurological postulate:
Whenever central neural correlates of projection-
level signals are simultaneously active and in fibrous
contact, either directly or mediately, an increased
dependence of one on the other results.
(52, p.79)
Here, Osgood envisages a series of neural connections between cells
in the projection areas and certain more central cells. The latter may be
termed the "central neural correlates" of the former. Thus the firing of
a specific group of cells in the sensory projection area will produce ac¬
tivity in a corresponding group of central ceils. The firing of the
central neural correlates of a specific group of motor cells will be
followed by activation of the latter. The characteristics of projection
cells preclude the possibility of any relation of dependency growing out
of the simultaneous activation of different cell groups. At the integration
level, however, the simultaneous activation of two central correlates may,
over time, lead to an increase in the probability of one firing the other.
This relationship is assumed by Osgood (52, p.80) to be a direct function
of the density of fibrous contact at their synapse. Thus if there is a
thicker band of fibrous contacts between central neural correlates £ and b
than between a_ and c, or alternatively, the connection between a and c is
mediated by a third correlate x, the resultant tendency for correlate a to
activate b should be greater than its tendency to activate c.
Osgood then uses this neurological conception to advance two psycho¬
logical principles relating to sensory and motor integrations respectively:
PRINCIPLE I
The greater the frequency with which stimulus events A and B
are associated in the input of an organism, the greater will
be the tendency for the central neural correlates of one, a
to activate the central neural correlates of the other, b.
PRINCIPLE II
The greater the frequency with which response events A and B
are associated in the output of an organism, the greater will
be the tendency for the central neural correlates of one, a,
to activate the central neural correlates of the other, b.
(52, p.81)
Taken together, these principles state in effect that the patterning
and ordering of events in the stimulating environment on the one hand, and
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in the overt behaviour of the organism on the other, will produce equiv¬
alent or parallel organizations within the sensory and motor nervous
systems respectively. Sensory and motor integrations function as classes
of intervening variables, anchored directly to antecedent and subsequent
variables via a simple frequency of co-occurrence function. The effect
of the frequency factor on what is observed may be expressed in two sub¬
sidiary principles:
PRINCIPLE III - EVOCATION
With high frequency of stimulus or response pairing, the
firing of central correlates of one will become a sufficient
condition for the excitation of the correlates of the other.
PRINCIPLE IV - PREDICTION
With lower frequency of stimulus or response pairing, the
central correlates of one will become merely a condition for
"tuning up" the correlates of the othhr.
(52, p.81)
The behavioural implications of these two principles are clear:
the higher the frequency with which a set of stimuli (or responses) have
occurred together, the greater is the probability that the appearance of
one member of the set will produce the central experience of the others
in their absence. Osgood believes that these integrations permit an in¬
crease in the stability of decoding and encoding operations. For example,
the perception of certain cues would increase the probability of also per¬
ceiving other cues that are in competition with other stimuli. The
initiation of certain responses would, in a similar fashion, increase the
probability of initiating others that happen to be in competition with
other action tendencies.
So far the model is capable of integrating sensory signals into
evocative and predictive relationships that reflect the redundancies of
the events to which the organism has been exposed. It is also capable of
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integrating motor signals into evocative and predictive units which para¬
llel the redundancies in its own behaviour. Thus, dependency relationships
between two or more responses will develop as a function of the number of
times these responses have occurred in contiguity in the past experiences
of the organism. The model covers then, both S-S and R-R relationships
but not S-R relations. What is required now is a construct that will
account for the adaptive nature of behaviour. The higher level of organi¬
zation which such a construct implies is termed by Osgood, representation
(52, p.91), and since his discussion of this level constitutes his theory
of meaning it will be necessary to proceed with a rather more detailed
account of his views.
Osgood begins by observing that stimulus events may be related to
response events at all levels of organization. Some sensory signals have
innate connections with specific responses to form unconditioned reflexes.
Additional signals may acquire such direct connections with motor signals
to form conditioned reflexes (53, p.354).1 At the Integrational level,
associations between complex patterns of sensory and motor signals may also
be innate (instinctual behaviour) or acquired e.g. sensory-motor skills
that have been relegated from higher levels of cortical control. However,
the most important mechanism for linking sensory and motor events operates,
Osgood claims, through a two-stage mediation process:
The essential notion here is that in the course
of associating external stimuli with overt behaviour,
some fractional representation of this overt behaviour
becomes anticipatory, producing self-stimulation that
has a symbolic function.
(52, p.92)
In the reference cited it would appear that conditioned reflexes
are established at the Projection level. This is a slip on Osgood's
part since, by definition, activity at this level cannot be modified
by experience. A higher level of organization must therefore be
invoked.
Osgood admits that the postulation of mediation processes is not
a theoretical innovation. The same notion finds expression in Hull's
concept of the pure stimulus act (34), Tolman's "sign-significate
expectation" (SO), and Guthrie's "movement-produced stimulus" (28).
But he claims that both Hull and Guthrie called on mediation only in
dire extremities, whereas he himself considers it to be the usual form
of S-R learning and crucial to a satisfactory account of cognition. In
this respect, Osgood considers that the basic problem of symbolic processes
concerns the circumstances in which certain stimuli become signs of some¬
thing else. Before answering this question, he finds it necessary to
introduce the term "significate" which is defined as "any pattern of
stimulation that regularly and reliably elicits a predictable pattern of
behaviour". (53, p.355). All unconditioned stimuli would then be signif-
icates; so also would previously learned relations. The basic problem may
now be rephrased as follows: how is it possible for neutral, arbitrary
stimulus patterns to become signs of significates? Osgood suggests the
answer:
•»
Whenever a neutral stimulus (sign-to-be) is paired
with a significate and this pairing occurs sufficiently
close in time to a reinforcing state of affairs, the
neutral stimulus will acquire an increment of association
with some distinctive portion of the total behaviour
elicited by the significate.
(53, p.355)
It is assumed that certain components in the total reaction to the
significate are detachable in the sense that they tend to move forward in
the conditioning sequence in what might be termed an anticipatory fashion.
Osgood calls these reaction components "representational mediation
processes" (53, p. 356). They are representational in that, although
elicited by the sign, they are part of the behaviour produced by the
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significate. They are mediational because the stimuli which they produce
can become associated through ordinary instrumental learning, with various
overt responses appropriate to the significate. As such they constitute
the meaning of the sign.
A simple illustration of Osgood's two-stage paradigm is presented
in Figure 2. The significate (S) is in this case an unconditioned
stimulus. The feel and taste, of milk in the mouth is reflexly associated
S ■— * R







8 ^ r > s >R (vocalizing, arm-reaching
(sight of bottle) m m x lip-smacking, sucking)
FIGURE 2
OSGOOD'S PARADIGM OF SIGN-LEARNING
with a pattern of behaviour (RT)• Initially the sight of the bottle does
not initially elicit behaviour that is appropriate to S. The frequent
pairing of these two discriminably different stimuli however, leads to the
detachment of certain components of and their consequent association
with the sight of the bottle. When this latter stimulus elicits these
components or representational mediational processes (rm »sm)
it becomes a sign ( S ) of the significate, S.
What characteristics determine which components of the total
reaction to the significate will become available as rrn > sm
processes? Osgood (52, p.93) suggests the following: (1) energy expen¬
diture - the less the energy expended by the component, the more likely
is the possibility of association with a sign; (2) interference - the
less any component interferes with goal-directed behaviour, the more
likely it is to be included; (3) discrimination - the more discriminable
any Component is from those elicited by other signs, the more likely it is
to be included. From the literature on conditioning, there is considerable
evidence that certain components of the unconditioned response appear
earlier in the conditioned response than other components. Such components
would have rm— ,sm status in Osgood's theory. More recently, Osgood
(54, p.7) has suggested that some rm *sm processes may be purely
neural events (presumably as residuals or refinements of peripheral med¬
iators) .
The concept of the representational process leads directly to a
two-stage learning theory model since it is at once the terminal point of
decoding habits ( S *rm ) and the antecedent of encoding habits
(sm » Rx). The acquisition of decoding and encoding habits can proceed
independently. For example, a child may learn the danger significance of
a wasp (by virtue of having been stung) well before he learns to take
appropriate action. It is therefore possible to apply the conceptual
machinery of single-stage S-R theory to both sides of the two-stage model
(52, p.99) without, at the same time, being committed to a peripheraiist
point of view. Before discussing some of the important implications of
such a transfer, however, it will.be convenient for our purposes 'to examine
Osgood's conception of how language-signs acquire meaning for the child.
This is what Osgood terms "Linguistic decoding" (52, p.S3).
Prior to the acquisition and use of language, the child learns the
perceptual meaning of familiar objects in its environment (52, p.S4). The
sight of a ball, like the sight of the feeding bottle, is initially mean¬
ingless to the child. As a visual stimulus the ball acquires meaning only
when it is paired frequently with stimuli produced by direct contact and
related to weight, resilience and so forth. These latter stimuli are
assumed to produce, regularly and reliably, a total reaction comprised
of grasping, bouncing, squeezing, and pleasurable autonomic reactions
associated with play-behaviour. The sight of the ball as a visual
sensory integration then comes to elicit fractional components of this
total reaction as representational mediation processes, and as such is
noxtf a perceptual sign. It follows that this sign becomes a significate
if it in turn elicits (via the acquired rm »sm process) a total
reaction that is regular and reliable. When the original significate
and the perceptual sign are now paired with the auditory stimulus "ball"
in the presence of reinforcement, the new stimulus will acquire fractional
components of the total response to the perceptual sign. There will
probably be a direct transfer of the representational process itself. The
auditory stimulus "ball" is now a sign of the object "ball". The total
sequence is illustrated in Figure 3.
S :
(tactile and kinaesthetic /■ (grasping, etc.)




> sm (finger contractions
"ball") '
(visual stimulus * ^ ' etc.)
"ball") \
\
rmL sml ("looking for ball",
(auditory stimulus crawling, etc.)
"ball")
FIGURE 3
OSGOOD'S PARADIGM OF WORD-MEANING
or LINGUISTIC DECODING
The acquisition of linguistic decoding habits represents only the
zy
first phase in the development of symbolic processes. The second phase
"linguistic encoding" (52, p.95ff) is rather more complicated in nature.
The origin of encoding, according to Osgood, lies in the circular reflex
of babbling whereby the occurence of vocalizations becomes a sufficient
condition for their repetition. Through primary stimulus generalization
it becomes possible for someone other than the child himself to elicit
babbling. People in the child's environment will tend to "feed back"
only those sounds that approximate most closely to the spoken language.
Eventually, on hearing his mother say "ball", the child will return the
vocalization as an approximate imitation, but this imitative labelling
has no meaning until the auditory stimulus "ball" is paired with the sight
of the ball. The pairing should have two consequences: (1) the develop¬
ment of a single-stage association between the sight of the object and the
imitative label, and (2) a two-stage mediated association between the
sight of the object and the imitative label. This process is shown in
Figure 4. The broken arrow from r^ to vRc indicates that the meaning of









OSGOOD'S PARADIGM OF SEMANTIC ENCODING
The visual sign (S) of the ball has been transferred to the child's vocal-
V
ization of "ball". The single-headed unbroken arrow from sm to Rc indicates
that the self-stimulation produced by the mediating reaction elicits the
JU
vocalization "ball". The instrumental behaviour associated with the same
mediating reaction is of course still retained (sm »>RX). Any condition
that elicits the crucial representational process is thereby capable of
mediating the correct vocalization.
According to Osgood (54 p.8) the vast majority of signs used in
ordinary communication are assigns. An assign is a sign that derives its
meaning through association with more primary linguistic signs. Thus by
looking up an appropriate reference book, it is possible to learn the
>
meaning of "zebra" without being physically confronted with the animal.
The assign's meaning is in effect the integration of portions of the med¬
iating reactions already associated with the more primary signs. The
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FIGURE 5
OSGOOD'S PARADIGM OF ASSIGN-LEARNING
As has been noted, Osgood maintains that it is possible to apply
single-stage S-R constructs to his model. In this respect he leans
heavily on Hull's concept of habit-family hierarchy (35,36) for demon¬
strating man's flexibility in the use of language (52, p.96ff). Hull
distinguishes between two kinds of hierarchy: (1) the convergent
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hierarchy which involves the association of different stimuli with a
common response pattern, and (2) the divergent hierarchy, in which one
stimulus situation is variably associated with a number of different
responses. Osgood suggests that in his two-stage model, both decoding
and encoding habits may take the form of divergent or convergent habit-
family hierarchies. At the decoding stage, different sensory integrations
may be associated with a common mediating reaction to form a convergent
sign hierarchy. (e.g. STYLE and FASHIOH). Alternatively, one sensory
integration may be associated with a number of different mediating
reactions to produce a divergent sign hierarchy (e.g. CASE). The stim¬
ulus properties of mediating reactions permit the establishment of both
convergent and divergent hierarchies at the encoding stage.
Again, following Hull, Osgood (52, p.97) suggests that the prob¬
ability structure of the set of associations within a hierarchy will be
determined by the rank-order of habit strength. Thus, in a divergent
decoding hierarchy for example, the alternative meaning which has the
greatest probability of being elicited by the sign, is that which has
been most frequently paired with the sign in the past experience of the
individual. Evidence for the hierarchical structure of association comes
from research by Skinner (63, 64), Thumb and Marbe (75), Cason and Cason
(6), Bousfield and Sedgewick (4), and Bousfield and Barclay (3). Of
particular interest is a study by Foley and MacMillan (22) in which sub¬
jects ware assigned to one of five groups. Two of the groups were
composed of first and second-year law students respectively; two groups
comprised first and second-year medical students, and finally, a control
group of non-professional students. All subjects were then asked to write
down their associations to each of a list of forty stimulus words, half of
which were homophones interpretable in legal, medical or non-professional
senses. It was found that there was a significant relationship between
professional status and the interpretations placed on the homophones.
Furthermore, the consistency of such interpretations increased with
amount of professional training.
Probability structures are subject to the influence of context,
set, and drive. For example, if a sign has a number of alternative
meanings, we can raise to near certainty the probability of a sub-dominant
association by providing an appropriate context. Thus, the linguistic
sign CASE presented to one subject out of context might elicit a dominant
meaning derived from the past association of this sign with travel. In
the context HOSPITAL, the sub-dominant meaning associated with illness
would in all probability be elicited first. Again, if the individual is
set for certain meanings and not others, sub-dominant associations may
acquire high probability values - at least throughout the duration of
the task.
Drive has a highly complex influence on associative hierarchies.
Osgood (53, p.367) follows Hebb (31) in that he distinguishes between
the cue-effects and the energizing effects of drive. He maintains (53,p.388)
that the cue-effects of a given drive increase the availability of meaningful
processes previously associated with the drive. Support for this hypothesis
comes from research by Sanford (61) and Levine, Chein and Murphy (43) in
which it was found that frequency of 'food' interpretations of ambiguous
stimuli was influenced by the degree of hunger motivation present in the
subjects. In another study, Postman and Bruner (56) asked their subjects
to decode tachistoscopically-presented sentences. They found (among other
things) that experimentally produced stress had the apparent effect of
increasing the frequency of aggressive and escape words in the interpre¬
tations offered by subjects. For example, "tests much" was read as "treat
rough" while "sacred" was read as "screamed". This kind of behaviour is
of course very similar to that elicited by projective techniques such as
the Rorschach and the T.A.T.
The energizing effects of drive are believed by Osgood (53,p.370)
to vary x^ith both the amount of generalized drive present and with the
task to be performed. In this matter he employs the general relation
between drive and behaviour postulated by Hull (37, p.229) and elaborated
by Taylor (70) and Farber and Spence (21). This is the so-called, multi¬
plicative relation according to which increases in drive strength raise
the probability of alternative reactions in proportion to their initial
habit strengths. This means that the relatively more probable alternatives
would become even more probable, while the sub-dominant alternatives would
become even less probable.
This theory has led to the general prediction that subjects learning
under high irrelevant drive should perform more efficiently in tasks where
the initially dominant response is correct, but should do relatively worse
when sub-dominant responses must be selected or discriminated. Experiments
by Beam (2), Spence, Farber and McFann (67) and Spence, Taylor and Ketchel
(68) have borne out this prediction.
By way of summary, Osgood's theory states that linguistic signs
acquire their meaning through association with significates - stimuli that
regularly and reliably elicit a particular response pattern - and in the
presence of reinforcement. Parts of the total response to the significance
are transferred to the sign as representational mediating processes. These
processes produce stimuli which in turn elicit responses that are appropr¬
iate to the significate. Representational mediating processes may undergo
refinement to the point where they may be purely neural events. When
meaning in language is being acquired in early childhood, linguistic
signs are paired initially with perceptual signs. Later, new linguistic
signs may acquire their meaning through association with more primary
linguistic signs. This is known as assign-learning. Signs, their
meanings and the responses mediated by these meanings may form con¬
vergent and divergent hierarchies. The base probability structures of
these hierarchies may be influenced by contest, set and drive.
CHAPTER IV
THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL
It will be recalled that in Osgood's model, encoding involves the
selective encoding of instrumental acts, Rx, by the representational
mediating process, rm Intentional encoding can take one of two
forms, non-linguistic (e.g. gestures, changes in facial expression) and
linguistic. It is the latter form which Osgood (54, p.13) considers as
the sounder base for the development of a quantitative index of meaning.
From this line of thinking Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (54) constructed
the Semantic Differential, an instrument designed to identify and measure
the meaning of any sign, but particularly suited for linguistic signs or
concepts.
The Semantic Differential consists of a set of bi-polar adjectival
scales. The meaning which any concept holds for any individual is ob¬
tained by asking him to indicate the direction and intensity of his
association of scale and concept by checking one of the intervals or
steps between each adjectival pair. The basic assumption is that the
bi-polar scales employed in the Differential constitute a representative
sample of all the ways in which meaningful judgments can vary.
Osgood's analysis of the logic of semantic differentiation begins
(54, p.25) with the postulation, of a semantic space, Euclidean in character
and of unknown dimensionality. Each bi-polar scale is assumed to represent
a straight-line function that passes through the origin of this space.
Research on synesthesia by Karwoski, Odbert, and Osgood (40) and on social
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stereotypes by Stagnar and Osgood (69)indicates that many bi-polar
adjectival scales are highly inter-correlated. It therefore follows
that to define the semantic space with maximum efficiency, it is necessary
to factor-analyse the adjectival scales. This procedure permits the
identification of the minimum number of orthogonal dimensions required
to exhaust the dimensionality of the semantic space. Those scales
which are most representative of each dimension may then be used to
differentiate the meaning of any concept. In other words, semantic
differentiation involves successive judgments of a concept on a set of
scales of known dimensionality. Each judgment serves to localize the
concept as a point in the semantic space.
We may illustrate Osgood's technique with an example. Let us
assume that the factor-analysis of a set of scales has established only
two orthogonal dimensions and that the scales "good-bad" and "strong-
weak" are most representative of Dimensions I and II respectively. A
subject is then asked to rate the concepts MARRIAGE and DEATH against
each scale. To permit the registration of intensity of rating, we insert
seven intervals between the adjectival poles and assign a numerical value
to each. The subject then produces the following record:
MARRIAGE
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3





Strong _ JL. weak
These ratings may be plotted directly in a semantic space defined
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TWO CONCERTS PLOTTED IN THE SEMANTIC SPACE
The Mathematico - Psychological Isomorphism
In effect we now have two definitions of meaning: in terms of
the two-stage model, the meaning of a sign in a particular context is
the representational mediating process elicited by it; in mathematical
terms, the meaning of a sign is operatioixally defined as a point in
the semantic space that is established by dimensional co-ordinate values.
Osgood (54, p.26) assumes that an isomorphic relationship exists
between dimensions in the semantic space and the representational
mediating processes within the individual. A point in space has two
essential properties, namely, direction from the origin, and distance
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from the origin. The direction from the origin is determined by the
alternative polar terms selected, and the distance, by the particular
scale position checked. The properties of direction and distance,
Osgood maintains, may be identified with the quality and intensity of
(psychological) meaning respectively. The basic assumptions are (1)
that there is a finite number of representational mediating reactions
available to the individual;- (2) that this number corresponds to the
number of dimensions or factors in the semantic space and (3) that
linguistic quantifiers used to identify scale positions have been assoc¬
iated in past encoding experience x<?ith more or less equal degrees of
intensity for all rTO processes.
Osgood, admits that this isomorphic conception is something of a
tour de force. Indeed it is doubtful whether for many practical purposes,
there is any need to tie the Semantic Differential to any particular
theory. Osgood, however, feels that the speculative isomorphism may have
its merits:
.....If we are to use the semantic differential as an
hypothesis-testing instrument, and if the hypotheses
regarding meanings and changes in meaning are to be
drawn from learning-theory analysis, some such rationale
as has been developed here is highly desirable.
(54, p.30)
The Dimensionality of the Semantic Space
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (54, Chap.2) carried out a series of
factor analytic studies designed to isolate and identify the major factors
operating in meaningful judgments. In the first investigation, forty
common nouns were read in fairly rapid succession to a group of two hun¬
dred students. These subjects were required to write dox-jn after each
stimulus noun the first adjective that occurred to them. A frequency count
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was obtained for all adjectives, irrespective of stimulus source. The
fifty most frequently used adjectives were then bi-polarized (e.g. 'good'
became 'good-bad') and a seven-step intensity scale inserted between each
adjectival pair. One hundred students were then asked to rate each of
twenty common and diversified concepts against each of the fifty scales.
The matrix of intercorrelations among scales was then factored by the
ccntroid method.
Four factors were extracted and rotated into simple structure,
maintaining orthogomality among the factors. The first factor, identified
as evaluative, and characterized by such scales as 'good-bad', 'beautiful-
ugly' and'kind-cruel', accounted for 33.73 per cent of the total variance
and 68.55 per cent of the common (extracted) variance. The second factor,
identified as a potency variable accounted for 7.62 per cent and 15.46 per
cent of the total and consmon variances respectively. Representative of
this factor were such scales as 'large-small', 'strong-weak' and'heavy-
light'. The third factor which appeared to be an activity variable accoun¬
ted for 6.24 and 12.66 per cent of the total and common variances respect¬
ively. Typical activity scales were 'fast-slow', 'active-passive' and
'hot-cold'. The fourth factor accounted for a very small percentage of
the total and common variances, and since no scale had a loading of greater
than 0.27 on this factor, it was left unidentified.
The possibility that the factorial structure of the scales was
partly attributable to the concepts used led to a second investigation.
The same fifty bi-polar adjectives were employed but no concepts were
introduced. Instead, each of the fifty adjectival pairs was presented
once with every other pair. Forty subjects were then required to indicate
which of the polar terms of one pair most closely resembled a designated
member of the first pair. The measure of relation used in this analysis
was the percentage of agreement among subjects for each judgment. The 50
x 50 matrix of percentages was factorized by the D-method (54., p.332).
As in the first study, the first three dimensions extracted x^ere
evaluation, potency and activity. A comparison of the factorial struc¬
ture of the two studies indicated a high degree of similarity.
The third study reported by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum involved
the selection of seventy-six bi-polar adjectives from Roget's Thesaurus•
Twenty concepts were employed. These comprised five groups of four
concepts relating to persons, physical objects, abstractions, events and
institutions respectively. The concepts were rated by one hundred sub¬
jects against each seven-step adjectival scale. Intercorrelations of
scales were then entered in a 76 x 76 matrix. This matrix was factored
first by the centroid method and then by the Square Root method (90).
The unrotated centroid analysis produced eight factors, the first
three of which were evaluation, potency and activity. The first factor,
evaluation accounted for about tx^ice as much variance as potency and
activity, and these in turn accounted for about twice as much variance as
any of the remaining factors. Rotation of this structure did not affect
the relative dominance of the first three factors. The remaining factors
could not be identified.
Square Root analysis of the same data yielded eight identifiable
factors, the first three of which xrere evaluation, potency and activity.
The fourth factor, stability was characterized by such scales as 'sober-
drunk', 'stable-changeable','rational-intuitive', and 'sane-insane'.
Tautness, the fifth factor seemed to underlie 'angular-rounded', 'straight
curved', and 'sharp-blunt'. The sixth factor, novelty, was characterized
by such scales as 'new-old','unusual-usual', and 'youthful-mature'.
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Receptivity emerged as the seventh factor. This factor appeared to be
somewhat diffuse, producing quite small loadings on a large number of
scales. Scales that were predominantly receptive included 'savoury-
tasteless', 'colourful-colourless', 'interesting-boring' and 'pungent-
bland'. The last factor extracted was aggressiveness, which had a
sizeable loading in only one scale, 'aggressive-defensive'.
On the basis of these and other investigations, Osgood, Suci and
Tannenbaum (54, p.71) conclude that the semantic space is multi-dimensional
but that the relative importance of the different dimensions in mediating
judgment varies considerably. Only three factors, Evaluation, Potency and
Activity can be considered as dominant in this respect. The authors admit
that the relative importance of factors is influenced to some degree by
the concepts employed. The factorial composition of scales is relatively
unaffected by the method of factor analysis that is employed.
Reliability
The essence of any question relating to reliability is whether
score deviations from test to re-test are due to chance or to real diff¬
erences. Osgood, Luci and Tannenbaum (54, p.l26ff) have reported
reliability estimates of their semantic differential scales for both
groups and individuals. For groups, the probability of obtaining a
chance average deviation of one-half of a scale unit (in a seven-step
scale) or greater is 0.024 for Evaluative scales. For Potency and
Activity scales, the corresponding probability values are 0.009 and
0.017 respectively. Reliability estimates for individual subjects
are, as might be expected, considerable poorer. An absolute deviation
of 1.50 scale units may occur by chance once in a hundred times for
Evaluative scales and approximately five times in a hundred for both
Potency and Activity scales.
Validity
The validation of the semantic differential scales and their
dimensional attributes presents a serious problem since., as Osgood,
Suci and Tannenbaum admit (54, p.140), there is no independent
quantitative criterion of meaning with which scales or dimensions
can be correlated. They consequently appeal to face validity and
cite a number of studies to illustrate the strength of their claim in
this respect. For example, in one study (54, p'. 94) semantic differen¬
tiation of ten concepts produced three clusters in the semantic space.
The first cluster comprised QUICKSAND, DEATH and FATE; the second in¬
cluded WHITE ROSE-BUDS, GENTLENESS and SLEEP: the third cluster comp¬
rised HERO, VIRILITY and SUCCESS. The tenth concept, METHODOLOGY was
clearly separated from these three groupings. This is the kind of
arrangement we might have expected had no scales been used at all.
A second approach to validation is to predict specific
behaviour of individuals on the basis of test performance. Here the
assumption is that the behaviour in question is mediated by the
same variables that underlie test performance. Osgood, Suci and
Tannenbaum (54, p.142) employed this assumption in predicting voting
behaviour from semantic differential ratings. Three and a half
months prior to the 1952 United States Presidential Election, fifty-
five subjects ware asked to indicate how they intended to vote.
Twelve were very certain that they would vote for Stevenson; twenty-
five were just as certain that they would vote for Eisenhower, and eighteen
were uncertain. All subjects rated twenty social, economic and political
concepts on a form of the Semantic Differential. Osgood, Suci and
Tarmenbaum argued that if voting behaviour depends upon one's attitudes
and meanings, then the vote of each "Don't know" should be predict¬
able from the correspondence of his concept-meanings with those of
the two other groups. Each uncommitted subject's ratings of the
twenty concepts on the 'fair-unfair' (evaluative) scale were com¬
pared with the mean responses of the prospective Stevenson and
Eisenhower groups respectively. Those individuals whose concept-
meanings were closer to those of the Stevenson group than to those
of the Eisenhower group were regarded as prospective Stevenson voters,
an<^ vice versa. Of the eighteen "don' t-knows", fourteen voted as
predicted, a figure significant at the 5 per cent level. When the ratings
on the "strong-weak" (potency) scale were combined with evaluation, cor¬
rect predictions were made in seventeen out of the eighteen cases, a
figure significant at the one per cent level of confidence.
A third approach to the validation of the semantic differential
scales takes the form of comparisons of concept ratings with in¬
dependent clinical judgments. Osgood and Luria (55) report an unusual
opportunity that was afforded for such an investigation. Thigpen and
Cleckley (72) had submitted to The Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology a manuscript entitled "A Case of Multiple Personality".
Acting on a suggestion from the editor, J. McV. Hunt, Thigpen and
Cleckley administered a form of the semantic differential to their
patient on two occasions to each of the three personalities assumed
by her. Osgood and Luria were informed that they were dealing with
a case of multiple personality, that the patient was a married mother,
and that she had a job outside of house-keeping. On this information
alone, they undertook an analysis of each personality on the basis
of the semantic differential protocols. These analyses were than
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compared with the clinical observations made by Thigpen and Cleckley.
On the whole a fairly close correspondence was noted. By way of
illustrations, the semantic structure for one of the personalities,
Eve Black, included two major clusters. The concepts DOCTOR, ME,
PEACE OF MIND, HATRED, FATHER and FRAUD all shared the common meaning of
being both good and strong. The second cluster, comprising CHILD, MY
SPOUSE, LOVE, MY JOB, and SEX, was regarded as being both bad and passive.
Part of the interpretation offered by Osgood and Luria runs as follows:
.... Eve Black has achieved a violent kind of
adjustment in which she perceives herself as
literally perfect, but, to accomplish this break,
her way of perceiving 'the world' becomes
completely disoriented from the norm.
.... But if Eve Black perceives herself as good,
then she also has to accept HATRED and FRAUD
as positive values, since (we assume) she has
strong hatred and is socially fraudulent. What
are positive values for most people - CHILD,
MY SPOUSE, MY JOB, LOVE and SEX - are completely
rejected as bad and passive.... Like a completely
selfish infant, this personality is entirely
oriented around the assumption of its own
perfection, personal perfection is apparently the
demand acceded to rather than sexuality.
(55, p.584)
Thigpen and Cleckley's observations are remarkably similar:
.... She lies glibly and without compunction
.... Obviously a party girl. Shrewd, childlishly
vain and egocentric .... A touch of sexiness
seasons every word and gesture. But
apparently she had no desire for sexual relations
but often enjoyed frustrating her supposed
husband by denying herself to him.
(72, p.138)
Still another approach to the validation of the semantic
differential scales in clinical work involves the comparison of
semantic structure before and after therapy with the clinical
observations of the therapist. Osgood; Suci and Tannenbaum (54;
p.246) report a study of this kind that was carried out in col¬
laboration with 0. H. Mowrer. Two patients; both agoraphobics;
responded to a form of semantic differential before; during and
after psychotherapy. The form included eight concepts (ME; MOTHER;
FATHER, BABY, LADY, GOD, SIN and FRAUD), and twenty scales.
Before therapy one of the patients, a young woman, rated ME as
closer in meaning to FATHER than to MOTHER. After therapy ME shifted
in meaning to form a cluster with MOTHER, LADY and BABY with FATHER
losing much of the favourable reactions elicited prior to therapy.
Mowrer suggests that this shift corresponded very well with the
clinical facts, since one of the patient's major problems was an
'alliance' with her father against her mother. During therapy this
situation was explored and eventually repudiated. .
Need for Further Research
Osgood, Suci and Tanhenbaum admit (54, p. 153) that one of
the major gaps in the work of validation is that no experimental
checks have been made on the assumed isomorphism between meaning
as a representational mediating process and meaning operationally
defined as a point in the semantic space. Until such a check is
made, it is very difficult to draw inferences about the processes
underlying sign-learning. Support for the isomorphic relationship
would help to clear the way for a greater understanding of the in¬
dividual differences that might be revealed in the semantic
H-U
differential ratings of different clinical groups. The studies






AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF OSGOOD'S MATHEMATICO - PSYCHOLOGICAL
ISOMORPHISM OF MEANING.
THE PROBLEM
It follows from Osgood's isomorphic conception of meaning that
common or highly similar representational mediating processes
must underlie concepts that "cluster" in the semantic space. A
corollary of this statement is that signs or concepts that do not
cluster in the semantic space must differ with respect to their
underlying representational mediating processes. The validity of
such an isomorphism may be tested through an experimental investi¬
gation of the following hypotheses:
I. An experimentally produced change in the
meaning of one sign in a semantic cluster
will be associated with corresponding changes
in the meaning of other signs in the cluster.
II. An experimentally produced change in the meaning
of a sign will not affect the meaning of signs
which do not lie in the semantic vicinity.
RELATED RESEARCH
The reasoning upon which these hypotheses rest draws heavily
on the literature on semantic generalization. Kapustnik (39)
Smolenskaya (66), Kotliarevsky (42), Metzner (49) and Traugott (82)
have all demonstrated that a response conditioned to a non-verbal
stimulus such as a colour or tone generalizes to the verbal sign
of the conditioned stimulus. Kapustnik (39) also found that a
response conditioned to a verbal sign of an object generalizes
back to the object itself. Razran (57), Traugott (82) and Riess (58)
obtained sign-to-sign generalization and these three investigators
agree that generalization is greater for semantically similar words
(synonyms) than for phonetically similar words (homonyms). In a
subsequent study Riess (59) qualified his position when he found
that in early childhood homonym generalization preceds synonym
generalization. This position is however reversed as the child
grows older.
These findings would have been predicted from Osgood's two-
stage learning theory model. It will be recalled that signs which
are variably associated with the same representational mediating
process constitute a convergent sign hierarchy. This hierarchy is
established by associating a group of signs with the same significate
If we associate one of the signs with a new significate we are, in
effect, establishing a new representational mediating process which
should now become available to the other signs of the hierarchy.
In the studies quoted above, generalization was demonstrated with
words whose semantic relationships were clearly of a denotative
nature, e.g. STYLE and FASHION. However since Osgood makes no dis¬
tinction between what might be termed demotative convergent sign
hierarchies and connotative convergent sign hierarchies, we should
expect the latter type to exhibit the same characteristics of general
zation.
It should be noted that the "old" representational mediating
process linking a hierarchy of signs does not disappear when a new
common representational process is established. Following Hull
(as Osgood does) it is possible to reduce the effective reaction
potential of a habit, but it is not possible to remove the habit
itself. This means that the new meaning must acquire a higher
effective reaction potential if it is to compete successfully.
PROCEDURE
The experimental design comprises a three-stage procedure;
firstly the construction of a suitable form of a Semantic
Differential Scale; secondly, the establishment of equated groups
to be designated Experimental and Control, and thirdly the intro¬
duction of the treatment condition.
1. Construction of the Scale
A Semantic Differential Scale was constructed, incorporating
the following eighteen concepts (signs) and twenty scales:
Concepts Scales
LOVE Beautiful - ugly
MARRIAGE good - bad
LIFE happy - sad
INTERCOURSE active - passive
FATHER relaxed - tense
MOTHER clean - dirty
MY REAL SELF healthy - sick
MY IDEAL SELF safe - dangerous
MY RELIGION hot - cold
SOCIALISM large - small
CAPITALISM sharp - dull
SUICIDE deep - shallow
DEATH strong - weak
HATE fast - slow
FEAR hard - soft
GUILT rational - ercotiona
DIVORCE serious - humorous
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT positive - negative
interesting - borin;
free - constrained
The considerations governing the selection of concepts were
that they should have direct relevance for the major purpose of this
dissertation; that they should be reasonably representative of
significant areas in the life-pattern of the individual and that
(on a pure clinical hunch), some of the concepts would cluster,
and others would not.
The selection of the scales was a somewhat difficult task.
Osgood (54, p.187) has found that the meaning of scales and their
relations to other scales appear to vary with the concept being
judged. In particular, his research suggests that the more
emotionally loaded the concept being judged, the more the meaning of
all scales shifts toward evaluative connotation. If this is so, we
can make no assumptions about the factorial composition of our scales,
since we can be reasonably certain that the concepts employed are
emotionally loaded- This means that we cannot merely select groups
of relevant scales that are representative of say, evaluation, activity
and potency respectively, and by summing and averaging raw scores
derive a semantic structure. The inherent dangers of such a procedure
can be demonstrated if, for the sake of argument, we select good-bad,
active-passive and strong-weak as being representative of the evaluative,
activity and potency dimensions respectively. If, as is quite possible,
these three scales are all employed as evaluative, the resultant seman¬
tic structure, assumed to be three-dimensional, would in fact be uni-
dimensional. To anticipate this difficulty it was necessary to factor-
ize all raw score matrices. The method used is discussed below and
in the Appendix.
The Semantic Differential Scale was prepared in the version
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described by Osgood (54, p.81) as Form II. One sheet of paper is
used for each concept and all scale judgments are elicited successively.
A seven step interval was used for each scale.
As was mentioned above, the experimental design calls for two
groups equated in terms of responses to the Semantic Differential.
Ideally, equating should be in terms of both means and variance, but
this seemed to present an impossible task since each subject produces
not one but three hundred and twenty raw scores. The best method of
overcoming this difficulty appeared to consist of equating in terms
of raw score means for each scale and removing subjects whose scores
showed extreme deviations from group trends. This proved to be a re¬
latively simple matter since, as was expected, many of the scales cor¬
related highly among themselves.
The Scale was presented individually to eighty-five paid volun¬
teers - unmarried undergraduates of both sexes enlisted in a first-year
psychology course. At the first session the following instructions
were given to all subjects.
"The purpose of this study is to measure the
meanings of certain things to various people
by having them judge them against a series of
descriptive scales. In taking this test, please
make your judgments on the basis of what these
things mean to you. On each page of this booklet
you will find a different concept to be judged
and beneath it a set of scales. You are to rate
the concept on each of these scales in order.
Here is how you are to use these scales:
If you feel that the concept at the top of the
page is very closely related to one end of the
scale, you should place your check-mark as follows:
Fair unfair
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(The examiner then demonstrated check-marking for
the other six positions of quite closely related,
only slightly related, neutral, etc.).
Sometimes you may feel as though you have had the same
item before on the test. This will not be the case, so
do not look back and forth through the items. Make each
item a separate and independent judgment. Work at fairly
high speed through this test. Do not worry or puzzle over
individual items. It is your first impressions that we
want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, be¬
cause we want your true impressions. When you have comp¬
leted this scale please do not discuss it or anything that
has transpired during this session. The success of the
experiment depends entirely on the silence of the subjects."
All subjects were then instructed to return two weeks later.
2. Equating of Groups
From the total sample of eighty-five subjects, two equated groups
of N = 14 (Experimental) and N = 24 (Controls) were obtained.^ The
matrices of raw-score averages for each of the groups are presented in
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) respectively. Osgood (54, p.140) has estimated
that a deviation of approximately four-tenths of a scale unit is signi¬
ficant at the five per cent level. Of the 320 pairs of entries in our
tables, 25 differ by 0.4 scale units or more. However, this is a crude
method for equating the groups. It was necessary to establish that
in rating the concepts, the groups did not differ in their use of
the scales, and that the groups did not differ with respect to the
location of the concepts in the semantic space. The first of these
questions called for a dimensional analysis of the scales. Each matrix
The difference in the size of the groups is accounted for
by the fact that the post-treatment analysis of Experi¬
mental and Controls Groups with N = 30 revealed the pos¬
sibility of a confounding factor due to sex. The original
Experimental Group had nineteen males and eleven females.
The removal of females from both groups and subsequent re-
equating reduced the size of both samples. The practical
difficulties involved did not permit the addition of more
Experimental subjects.
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of raw scale scores were therefore analyzed by the D-method of factor¬
ing. Since a full account of this method is given in Appendix A, it
will suffice to note here that in using the D-method, it is assumed
that the raw-score matrix defines a space of k dimensions such that
each scale i has co-ordinates (x...x...sici) on the k dimensions. The
purpose of the analysis is to obtain co-ordinates on a new set of k'
dimensions (where k' is less than k) with minimal residual variance.
If this goal is realized it follows that at least txvo of the scales
must have a common dimension. Conversely, if the number of dimensions
cannot be reduced, complete inter^scale independence must obtain. This
point has a particular bearing on the problem of equating by raw-score
matrices, since a difference between a pair of cell-entries for a
particular scale and concepts will be of greater significance when the
scale is dimensionally unique than when it is highly correlated with
other scales in the same matrix.
The results of the D-analyses are presented in Table 2. It
will be observed that the first dimension (Dim. I), characterized by-
such scales as 'happy-sad', 'good-bad' and 'beautiful-ugly' accounted
for 57.297c and 56.257, of the total variances in the Experimental and
Control matrices respectively. The second dimension (Dim. II), re¬
presented by such scales as 'deep-shallow', 'large-small' and 'sharp-
dull' accounted for only 25.94% and 23.997, of the total variances in the
respective matrices. It was decided not to carry the analyses beyond
this point since in only one case ('emotional-rational') did more than
507, of the variance within the individual scales remain unaccounted for.
Dimension I was identified as Evaluation and Dimension II suggested
Potency. The extent to which the Experimental and Control groups agreed
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with respect to their use of the scales is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Here the co-ordinate values (CI, CII) for each scale in Table 2
have been plotted. It will be observed that almost perfect agree¬
ment exists between the semantic structures. The degree of similarity
between the dimensional characteristics of these structures was de¬
termined statistically by applying Burt's Coefficient of Proportion¬
ality, 'e', (5) to the co-ordinate values, paired by scale, of
Experimental and Control groups. The formula for this co-efficient is:
where f^.; and g^, represent the respective co-ordinates of the kth
variable on the i-th and j-th dimensions obtained from the two analyses.
For Dimension I, the obtained 'e' value was 0.9S7 and for Dimension II
'e' = 0.987. Although significance estimates are not available for this
statistic, it would appear that since 'e' can be no greater than + 1.00,
the obtained co-efficients may be considered high enough to xrarrant the
conclusion that the scales were used in the same way by both the Ex¬
perimental and Control Groups.
The final step in the equating process involved a comparison
of the two groups with respect to the meaning of the concepts. Since
the D-analyses of the raw-score matrices indicated that the two prin¬
cipal dimensions of meaning were Evaluation (Dim. I) and Potency
(Dim. II), it was decided to employ representative scales from each
 
of these dimensions. From Dimension I the following ten scales
were selected, 'beautiful-ugly,' 'good-bad', 'happy-sad', 'relaxed-
tense', 'clean-dirty', 'healthy-sick', 'safe-dangerous', 'hot-cold',
'positive-negative', and 'free-constrained'. Only three scales,
'deep-shallow', 'large-small', and 'sharp-dull' could be considered
as representative of Dimension II. The co-ordinate values of all
concepts were then calculated by summing and averaging, for each
group,'the mean raw-scores obtained for each scale within the re¬
presentative sets (see Tables 1(a) and 1(b)). Concept-Origin dis¬
tances were then calculated by the distance formula.
where D.q is the linear distance between concept and Origin, and
d^-i is the algebraic difference between the co-ordinate of the con¬
cept on a particular dimension and the corresponding co-ordinate of
the Origin. Since the co-ordinate values of the Origin are by de¬
finition zero, the application of this formula involves no more than
determining the square root of the sums of the squares of the co-
1.
ordinate values obtained for Dimensions I and II respectively. The
results of this operation are presented in Table 3.
1. Thus, for example, the distance between the concept 'Corporal
punishment' and the Origin is, in the case of the Experimental Group
D
11
t /(-0.30 - 0)2 + (0.64 - Q)2
or simply
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TABLE 3 CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE VALUES AND CONCEPT - ORIGIN
DISTANCES: EXPERIMENTAL V.CONTROL (PRE-TREATMENT)
EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
Concept- Concept-
CONCEPTS D im. I Dim.II Origin Dist. D im. I Dim. II Origin Dist.
(A) Non-Cluster
Intercourse 1.46 1.21 1.90 1.49 1.11 1.86
Life 1.31 1.26 1.82 1.24 1.39 1.86
Father 1.09 1.19 1.61 1.05 1.03 1.47
Religion 0.91 0.74 1.17 0.93 0.75 1.20
My Real Self 0.98 0.91 1.34 0.87 0.99 1.32
Mother 1.47 0.59 1.58 1.51 0.64 1.64
Marriage 1.93 1.43 2.40 1.98 1.60 2.55
My Ideal Self 2.11 1.67 2.69 2.06 1.92 2.82
Love 2.03 1.74 2.67 1.98 1.79 2.67
(B) Cluster
Corporal Punish. -0.80 0.64- 1.02 -0.79 0.76 1.10
Guilt -1.31 0.71 1.49 -1.40 0.64- 1.54
Divorce -1.25 0.21 1.27 -1.25 0.22 1.27
Fear -1.35 0.66 1.50 -1.40 0.67 1.55
Suicide -1.57 0.45 1.63 -1.62 0.25 1.64
Death -0.56 0.47 0.73 -0.28 0.63 0.69
Hate -1.76 0.57 1.85 -1.69 0.40 1.74
No assumptions can be made concerning the distribution of either
the co-ordinate values or the concept origin distances in a semantic
space. For equating purposes it was therefore necessary to employ non-
parametric techniques. Since the observations are paired, Wilcoxon1s
Sign-Rank Test of Differences (17, p.251) is applicable. However, since
seven of the sixteen pairs of Dimension I co-ordinate values were nega¬
tive in sign, it was necessary to consider separately the seven concepts
involved.
The nature of this problem is readily appreciated by reference to
Fig.8(a) in which all concepts are plotted for each group. It will he
noted that 'Corporal Punishment', 'Guilt', 'Divorce', 'Fear', 'Suicide',
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'Death', and 'Hate' lie in a negative quadrant and their co-ordinate
values cannot, therefore, be pooled with those of the remaining con¬
cepts. Fortunately, these concepts fulfilled the expectation that
they would cluster in the semantic space, and it follows that for
equating purposes they would have had to be considered separately
in any case. For these reasons, the concepts in Table 3 have been
divided into "Non-Cluster" and "Cluster" respectively.
The application of Wilcoxon1s Sign Rank Test involves ranking
by size all non-zero differences between paired observations (rank I
for the smallest difference). All ranks that correspond to dif¬
ferences •whose signs (positive or negative) are in the minority with¬
in the total set are then summed arithmetically to give a statistic T.
The hypothesis tested is that the differences are symmetrically dis¬
tributed about a mean difference of zero. If this hypothesis is true,
T would coincide with the mean of such sums of randomly selected ranks,
T, which in turn is also half the sum of N successive ranks and which
is given by the formula:
T = N ( N + 1 )
4
(17, p.252)
The greater the deviation between T and T, the less is the
probability that the hypothesis is true, and the greater the pro¬
bability that the two sets of observations come from different popu¬
lations. For the purposes of equating we would require that for each
dimension, for the concept-origin distances, and for both "Cluster"
and "Non-Cluster" concepts, the hypothesis would be upheld with re¬
spect to the Experimental and Control Groups. The application of
Wilcoxons' Sign-Rank Test produced the findings summarized in Table 4
below. For the purposes of comparison, T-values required for signi¬
ficance at the .05, .02 and .01 levels are also included.
TABLE 4. APPLICATION OF WILCCXON'S SIGN-SANK TEST OF DIFFERENCES
TO EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE VALUES
AND CONCEPT-ORIGIN DISTANCES (PRE-TREATMENT)
Experimental N Expected Observed Significant T-Values
Versus Control f T Values .05 .02 .01
'Hon Cluster'
Dimension I 9 22.5 11.5 6 3 2
Dimension II Q 22.5 12.0 6 3 2
Concept-Origin 8 18.0 11.5 4 2 0
'Cluster'
Dimension I 6 10.5 10 0 - -
Dimension II 7 14.0 12 2 0 -
Concept-Origin 6 10.5 8 0
Ideally there would be perfect correspondence between the ex¬
pected and observed T-values to ensure perfect equating of the Ex¬
perimental and Control Groups. While this condition has been closely
approximated with respect to the "Cluster" concepts, there are con¬
siderable differences between the observed and expected T-values for
the 'Non-Cluster' concepts. However since none of these differences
approximate significance, it is possible to conclude, albeit with
caution, that the groups are equated.
3. Treatment
From the analyses carried out in the second stage of the pro¬
cedure, a number of concepts appeared to form a distinct "cluster"
in the semantic space (see Table 3 and Fig.8(a)). Having identified
the dimensional characteristics of this cluster, the concept "Suicide"
was selected as the independent variable and two weeks after the first
administration of the Semantic Differential Scale, each subject in
the Experimental Group -was given the following instructions:
"1 would like you to repeat the Scale you completed
at the first session, but before you do, I would like to
mention one of the concepts, rated by you. Concerning
this concept, 'Suicide', I would like to impress on you
that suicide may have certain positive attributes. For
example, in Japan, suicide represents the greatest sacri¬
fice an individual can make for family or national honour.
On occasion, in our own society, the reputations of
families and businesses have been preserved by opportune
suicides. Finally, suicide for some individuals offers
the only means of relief from an intolerable existence,
regardless of how right or how wrong such an action may
be in the eyes of society. I should like you to bear in
mind what I have said when you rate this concept. How¬
ever, the ratings you give must still reflect your own
personal views. To ensure that you have understood, I
shall repeat what I have said."
The intention of these instructions was to develop, by sug¬
gestion, a more favorable reaction on the subject's part to the
concept in question. The major hypothesis of this study states in
effect that an experimentally produced change in the meaning of a
concept will be associated with corresponding changes in the mean¬
ings of only those concepts that have a similar connotative mean¬
ing. The specific prediction advanced here is that if the Experi¬
mental subjects did react more favorably to the concept 'Suicide'
they would also react more favorably to the concepts 'Corporal
Punishment', 'Guilt', 'Divorce', 'Fear', 'Death', and 'Hate'.
No such associated changes would occur with respect to the other
('Non-Cluster') concepts in the Scale. The success of the treat¬
ment and the evidence for or against the hypothesis were assessed
through comparison with the Controls who repeated the Scale under
the identical conditions present during the first testing session.
RESULTS
To ensure that the dimensional characteristics of the scales
had not changed through the effects of time or treatment, B analyses
were carried out on the mean raw-score matrices (Tables 5(a) and 5(b))
of the Experimental (Post-Treatment) and Control (Repeat) Groups re¬
spectively. The findings of these analyses are presented in Table 6.
Burt's Co-efficient of" Proportionality was again used to determine
the extent to which the Control and Experimental (Post-Treatment)
groups agreed in their use of the scales. The obtained 'e' co-efficient
were 0.980 and 0.987 for Dimensions I and II respectively. An oppor¬
tunity was also afforded for determining the test-re-test reliability
of the dimensional characteristics of the scales. For the Experi¬
mental Group Burt's 'e* co-efficients were 0.969 and 0.975 for Dimen¬
sions I and II respectively; for the Controls the corresponding co¬
efficients were 0.998 and 0.990. These co-efficients are of high
enough order to suggest the dimensional characteristics of the scales
remained constant both within and between groups.
Concept co-ordinate values for all concepts were determined
by employing the same scales as those used in the final step in the
equating process. For Dimension I these were 'beautiful-ugly', 'good-
bad', 'happy-sad', 'relaxed-tense', 'clean-dirty', 'healthy-sick',
'safe-dangerous', 'hot-cold', 'positive-negative', and 'free-constrained
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For Dimension II, the representative scales selected were 'deep-
shallow', 'large-small', and 'sharp-dull'. As before the raw scale
scores for each concept were summed and averaged across each set of
representative scales on Dimensions I and II. The co-ordinate values
obtained from this operation are presented, together with concept-
origin distances, in Table 7. Wilcoxon's Sign-Rank Test of Dif¬
ferences was applied to co-ordinate values and concept-origin dis¬
tances. The results, summarized in Table §, bear out the prediction
made in Hypothesis II in that no significant differences were found
between Experimental and Control Groups with respect to the Non-
Cluster Concepts. Of the Cluster-Concept variables, only the Concept-
Origin distances appeared to differ in the predicted direction (signi¬
ficant at .05 level). However it will be observed that the T-values
computed for Dimensions I and II are substantially smaller than the
corresponding T-values for the Pre-Treatment conditions (See Table 4,
p.64) •
As a check on these findings, Wilcoxon's Sign Test was applied
to the test-re-test scores of the Experimental and Control groups
respectively. The hypotheses tested here are that no significant
differences between Control (Pre-Treatment) and Control (Post-Treat¬
ment) with respect to all concept co-ordinate values and concept origin
distances; and that for the Experimental Group, the 'Cluster' concept
co-ordinate values and concept co-ordinate values will be significantly
less in the Post-Treatment conditions than the corresponding values
and distances in the Pre-Treatment conditions. No such differences
should obtain with respect to the Non-Cluster concepts. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table 9.
TABLE 7 CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE VALUES AND CONCEPT-ORIGIN
DISTANCES: EXPERIMENTAL V- CONTROL (POST-TREATMENT)
Experimental Control
Concept- Concept-
Concepts Dim. I Dim.II Origin Dist Dim. I Dim. II Origin Dist.
(A) Non-Cluster
Intercourse 1.35 1.26 1.85 1.55 1.15 1.93
Life 1.21 1.31 1.78 1.16 1.44 1.85
Father 1.18 1.05 1.58 1.03 1.04 1.46
Religion 0.98 0.83 1.28 0.78 0.61 0.99
My Real Self 1.06 0.81 1.37 0.93 1.02 1.38
Mother 1.30 0.93 1.60 1.35 0.82 1.58
Marriage 1.80 1.55 2.37 1.72 1.36 2.19
My Ideal Self 1.91 1.52 2.44 1.89 1.65 2.51
Love 1.87 1.69 2.52 1.72 1.33 2.17
(B) Cluster
Corporal Punish. -0.73 0.40 0.83 -0.90 0.46 1.01
Guilt -1.34 0.33 1.38 -1.38 0.57 1.49
Divorce -1.06 0.09 1.06 -1.36 0.11 1.36
Fear -1.17 0.40 1.24 -1.48 0.35 1.52
Suicide -1.03 0.50 1.14 -1.68 0.38 1.72
Death -0.43 0.53 0.69 -0.10 0.86 0.87
Hate -1.69 0.54 1.77 -1.84 0.42 1.89
TABLE 8 APPLICATION OF WILCOXON'S SIGN-RANK TEST OF DIFFERENCES
TO EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE VALVES
AND CONCEPT-ORIGIN DISTANCES (POST-TREATMENT)
Experimental N T Observed Significant T -Values
Versus Control T-Values .05 .02 .01
'Non-Cluster'
Dimension I 9 22.5 11.0 6 3 2
Dimension II 9 22.5 16.0 6 3 2
Concept-Origin 9 22.5 13.0 6 3 2
'Cluster'
Dimension I 6 i 10.5 6 0 - -
Dimension II 6 10.5 7 0 - -
Concept-Origin 6 10.5 0 0 - -
1. The independent variable 'Suicide' is, of course, excluded from this
analysis•
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TABLE 9 APPLICATION OF WILCOXON'3 SIGN-SANK TEST OF DIFFERENCES
TO (I) EXPERIMENTAL (PRE-TREATMENT) AND EXPERIMENTAL
(POST-TREATMENT) (2) CONTROL (PRE-TREATMENT) AND
CONTROL (POST-TREATMENT) CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE AND
CONCEPT-ORIGIN DISTANCES
Exp. (PRE-TR) v. N T Observed Significant T-Values
Exp. (POST-TR) T-Values .05 .02 .01
Non-Cluster
Dimension I 9 22.5 6 6 3 2
Dimension II 9 22.5 22 6 3 2
Concept-Origin 9 22.5 10 6 3 2
Cluster
Dimension I 6 10.5 1 0 - -
Dimension II 6 10.5 2 0 - -
Concept-Origin 6 10.5 0 0 - -
Control (Pre-TR) N T Observed Signif icaiit T-Va lues
V. Control (Post-TR] T-Values .05 .02 .01
'Non-Cluster'
Dimension I 9 22.5 5 6 3 2
Dimension 11 9 22.5 16 6 3 2
Concept-Origin 9 22.5 8.5 6 3 2
'Cluster'
Dimension I 6 10.5 7 0 - -
Dimension II 6 10.5 5 0 - -
Concept-Origin 6 10.5 6.5 0 - -
Contrary to expectations, there was a significant drop in the magnitude
of the Dimension I co-ordinate values of the 'Non-Cluster' concepts
rates by the Experimental Group. However, since the Controls show a
corresponding drop in the re-test, it is unlikely that the treatment
was an operative factor. In any case, the intensities of rating as
measured by Concept-Origin distances did not change significantly in
either the Experimental or Control Groups.
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A somewhat clearer picture emerges with respect to the 'Cluster'
concepts. While the Controls remain fairly constant in their ratings,
the Experimental subjects manifested a marked and significant reduction
in rating intensity. A comparison of the Experimental and Control
Concept-Origin distances reveals a consistent difference between the
two sets (P= .05) in the direction predicted by the major hypothesis
of the study.
DISCUSSION
For the purposes of discussion, it will be useful to refer to
Figure 8(b) in which the differences between the Controls and Experi¬
mental Subjects are illustrated by a graph. It will be observed that
as compared with Figure 8(a) (see p.62), the 'Cluster' concepts rated
by the Experimental Group are relatively closer to the Origin of the
Semantic Space than those of the Controls. The most marked discrepancy
is with respect to the independent variable 'suicide'. The move¬
ment of this concept to the Origin was, of course, in the direction
predicted by the treatment. We also observe that the essential
identity of the 'Cluster' has been maintained, with, if anything, a greater
cohesiveness among its members. This effect is apparently due to mediated
generalization, and constitutes positive support for Osgood's iso¬
morphism.
This interpretation rests on the assumption that the observed
change in the ratings of 'suicide' by the Experimental subjects reflected
a genuine shift in the meaning of this concept. However it would be
possible to argue that the subjects were influenced more by a desire to
HUGHESOWENS315L-METRIC
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please the experimenter than by the nature of his suggestion. Alter¬
natively, it could be argued that the very nature of the suggestion
elicited acquiescence responses that did not correspond with the true
feelings of the subjects. A number of investigations including Edwards
(12, 13, 14), Hanley (29), Kenny (41), Taylor (71), Wiggins and
Rumrill (88), Cowen and Tongas (8), Wright (89) and Hillmer (33), have
found that ratings of statements in personality questionnaires and
attitude scales are apparently determined in part by a social desira¬
bility factor in behaviour. It will be recalled that the instructions
given to the Experimental Group in the treatment phase consisted princi¬
pally of references to the attitudes of other people to 'suicide' to¬
gether with a number of assertions from a possible authority figure
(the Experimenter). These assertions ran counter to the notion that
taking one's own life is necessarily a bad. thing. It would than be
possible to conclude that the total effect of the instructions con¬
stituted an implicit criticism of the ratings given to 'suicide' in
the pre-treatment administration of the Semantic Differential, together
with pointers on the direction in which changes should be made.
This interpretation is plausible enough to cast serious doubt that
a genuine shift occurred with respect to the meaning of 'suicide'.
However, if the observed changes in the meaning of this concept were
a function of acquiescence or social desirability, to what could the
observed changes in the remaining concepts in the cluster be attributed?
If the Experimental Group had divined the real object of the study,
it is possible that the desire to please could have determined the changes.
However, it is very unlikely that students taking an introductory course
fb
in psychology would be capable of such an insight. A more acceptable
suggestion would be the possibility that the factor of social desirability
determining the shift in 'suicide' generalized to the other concepts in
the same cluster. Stated more explicitly, the revision of the ratings
of 'suicide' to conform to the views'.of others might have given rise to a
re-examination of the other concepts on similar grounds. But even this
interpretation presents serious difficulties, since there would be no
reason to suppose that the generalization of social desirability would
be restricted to a particular group of concepts. The results indicate
that there was no significant change in the ratings of concepts lying
outside of the 'suicide' cluster. It seems likely therefore that there
were common bonds of meaning within the cluster and that if social de¬
sirability did in fact enter into the ratings, its influence was highly
selective and in a manner consonant x^ith the major hypothesis advanced
in this investigation. Nevertheless, while the social desirability
hypothesis confirms, if anything, the claim that clusters of concepts
in the semantic space are isomorphic with the organization of meanings
within the individual, it does cast serious doubt on the validity of
the co-ordinate values of these clusters as indices of the intensity
of (psychological) meaning.
In any investigation that calls for the analysis of reactions
to stimuli that have personal and social connotations, it seems in¬
evitable that social desirability will constitute a confounding element.
Unfortunately we do not know enough about the nature of this factor
to predict the extent of its influence.
Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the present study is
that, notwithstanding the possible influence of social desirability,
a certain degree of support is offered for the notion that the organi-
zation of concepts in the semantic space reflects their organization
within the personality structure of the individual. We may have,
therefore, in the Semantic Differential a diagnostic instrument of
considerable promise. The second study in this dissertation pur¬
sues this question.
SUMMARY
Two groups of single, male, undergraduates were equated on a
form of the Semantic Differential Scale and designated Experimental
and Control respectively. Each subject in the Experimental Group was
then presented with the suggestion that one of a cluster of negatively
evaluated concepts might have positive attributes. An experimentally
produced change in the meaning of this concept was successfully obtained.
Other concepts in the cluster changed in the same direction ;(i.e. elicited
more favorable ratings). Concepts radically different in meaning to
that of the independent variable did not appear to be affected by the
treatment. The Control Group, who repeated the Scale under the original
conditions, showed no such modifications in their ratings. The findings
were interpreted as constituting to some extent, positive evidence for
Osgood's isomorphic conception of the relationship between the Semantic




A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NORMAL AND NEUROTIC
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS
THE PROBLEM
This study represents an attempt to determine whether or not
neurotic, and normal groups differ with respect to their ratings of
concepts that are commonly acknowledged to have positive emotional
significance. In the previous investigation evidence was adduced
to support Osgood's contention that there may be an isomorphic re¬
lationship between dimensions in the Semantic Space and the media-
tional processes that underlie sign-learning. If a paradigm of
neurotic sign-learning behaviour can be fitted satisfactorily within
the framework of Osgood's theory of meaning, it should be possible to
predict the nature of any differences that might be expected between
the Semantic Differential ratings of normal and neurotic personali¬
ties .
It seems reasonable to assume that there are few concepts that elicit
unequivocally positive emotional reactions in the average person. This
is because the circumstances under which these concepts are learned
are seldom unequivocally pleasant or drive-reducing. This point is
of considerable importance in personality theory, since it has a direct
bearing on ambivalent behaviour, a characteristic feature of emotional
disturbances. The circumstances in which ambivalent reactions arise
are varied, but of particular significance are those in which the sign
(or concept) derives its connotative meaning from its co-occurrence
with two significates. The latter may be related through common
stimulus properties but;, nevertheless, elicit reciprocally antagon¬
istic reactions. An example of this is presented in Figure 9.
Here, the sign (S)."Mother" is associated with two significates
(Sj^ and S2) that are, in effect, two different kinds of stimulation
emanating from a common source ('mother'). According to Osgood's
Principal of Congruity (54, p.200) the reciprocally antagonistic
process rffi . sm and ^ ^ would































A LEARNING THEORY PARADIGM OF AMBIVALENCE
Thus, if the intensity of r ^s were strong and we 11-estab 1 ished,
and that of r , s weak and poorly established, the former would
m— f m
be only slightly reduced in intensity while the latter would, be con¬
siderably reduced in intensity. In short, there would be a compromise,
with the weaker r ^ yielding the greater amount of ground.
This example is probably fairly typical of the circumstances under
which most of us learn the connotative meaning of "MOTHER". It could
happen however that the intensity of the rr____ ^ s^ would be quite
strong, producing a correspondingly greater modifying effect on
r ,s . In this case a greater degree of ambivalence would be
r.r~ - -—> m °
attached to the concept.
If Osgood's isomorphism is sound, one would expect that the
greater the amount of ambivalence that is attached to a concept the
less is the likelihood that it will be given an unequivocally favour¬
able rating on a bi-polar scale such as 'good-bad'. Since it is a
well-knox-ra clinical fact that ambivalent behaviour is more character¬
istic of the neurotic than of the normal personality, it is possible
to predict that those personal and social concepts which elicit favour¬
able reactions in normal personalities will elicit less favourable
reactions in neurotics. An analysis of the ratings of such concepts
on a suitable forra of the Semantic Differential Scale should therefore
reveal that the concept-Origin distances of a neurotic group are con¬
sistently less than those of normals.
PROCEDURE
The Semantic Differential Scale used in the first study (see p. 50
seemed to be appropriate for the present purpose. The concepts employed
in that study fall into two fairly discrete classes as follows:
Class A (positively valued) - 'Intercourse,1 'Life', 'Father',
'Religion', 'My Real Self', 'Mother', 'My Ideal Self, 'Marriage',
and 'Love'.
Class B (negatively valued) - 'Corporal Punishment', 'Guilt', 'Divorce',
'Fear', 'Suicide',: 'Death', and 'Hate'. Although the primary interest
in this investigation centred on the Class A concepts, the Class B
concepts were included for two reasons: first, by interspersing them
with the Class A concepts, it was hoped to reduce the danger of position
errors in rating; second, it could not be safely assumed that the dimen¬
sional characteristics of the twenty scales employed would be identical
for both the normal and neurotic groups, and it was therefore necessary
2
to anticipate analyses of the mean raw scale score matrices (see below)
by providing a varied selection of concepts. As in conventional types
of factor analysis, this procedure facilitates, among other things, the
identification of extracted dimensions.
The Rorchach Ink Blot Test (60) was administered individually to
sixty-eight unmarried female students enrolled in a first-year psychology
course at the University of Edinburgh. Two groups, designated "Normals"
and "Neurotics" respectively, were established on the basis of the
Miale and Harrower-Erickson classification of neurotic signs (50).
In this study, the minimum number of signs for a "Neurotic" classifi¬
cation was arbitrarily fixed at six. Of the total samples, fifteen
Rorschach protocols met this criterion. The "Normals" consisted of the
fifteen subjects whose protocols contained the least number of neurotic
signs. The distribution of neurotic signs for each individual in each
group is presented in Table 10.
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individually to subjects in both groups. Within each group, the aver¬
age scale score for each concept was obtained. This procedure gener¬
ated a sixteen-by-twenty matrix of mean raw scale scores for each group.
2
Both matrices were analysed by the D -method. Scales representative
of the extracted dimensions were then employed to determine dimensional
co-ordinate values for all concepts. Concept-Origin distances were
then calculated. The hypothesis tested was that the Class A concept
Origin distances of the "Neurotics" would be significantly smaller than
those of the "Normals". This called for the application of Wilcoxon's
Sign-Rank Test of Differences.
RESULTS
The Dimensional Characteristics of the Scales
The mean raw score matrices for the Normals and Neurotics are
presented in Tables 11 (a) and 11 (b) respectively. From Table 12,
2
which shows the results of the D analyses of these matrices, it will
be seen that only two dimensions could be considered as contributing
substantially to the total matrix variances. Dimension I, passing
through the pivotal scale 'happy-sad', accounts for substantial pro¬
portions of the variance of the scales 'beautiful-ugly', 'good-bad',
'clean-dirty', 'healthy-sick', and 'safe-dangerous'. This dimension
appeared to be Evaluative in nature. Dimension II, passing through
'deep-shallow' and making a considerable contribution to the variance
of scales 'large-small', 'sharp-dull', 'serious-humorous' and 'inter¬
esting-boring' suggested a 'Potency' factor.
The similarity between the two groups with respect to the dimensional
characteristics of the scales was determined by computing Burt's
Coefficient of Proportionality for each dimension in turn. The obtained
TABLE11(a)NORMALGROUP-ME NAWSCOREM T IX
N=15
123456 Beaut.GoodH ppyPassiveRelaxClean UglyBadS dActi.TenseDirty
789101
SickafeHotL rgeSharp HealDang.ColdSmallDu


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE11(b)NEUROTICGR UP-MEANRAWSC REM T IX
N=15
1C.Pun 2Interc. 3Life 4Guilt 5Father 6Divor. 7Relig. 8RealS. 9Fear 10Suic. 11Mother 12Death 13Hate 14Marr. 15IdealS. 16Love
1 Beaut. Ugly -1.80 1.00 1.93 -2.53 1.33 -2.20 1.73 0.40 -2.00 -2.20 1.80 0.73 -2.87 2.0 2.20 2.80
2 Good Bad -0.40 -1.53 -1.73 1.07 -2.40 2.47 -2.27 -1.07 1.60 2.33 -2.27 -0.87 2.73 -2.60 -2.13 -2.47
3 Happy Sad -2.13 1.53 0.87 -2.13 1.53 -2.87 1.33 0.67 -1.60 -2.93 1.40 -0.80 -2.53 2.33 2.40 1.73
4 Pass. Act. -1.20 -1.67 -2.67 -0.73 -2.27 -0.60 -1.40 -1.60 -0.47 0.7 -1.93 0.60 -1.60 -2.20 -1.67 -2.53
5 Relax. Tense -2.00 0.73 -0.27 -2.20 0.07 -2.53 0.67 -0.33 -2.60 -2.73 -0.2 1.67 -2.53 1.47 2.67 1.40
6 Clean Dirty -0.40 1.47 1.20 -0.67 2.40 -0.87 1.60 2.00 -0.80 -1.20 2.33 1.27 -1.13 2.00 2.67 2.20
Sickafe HealthyDang,
9101 HotLargeSharp ColdSmallDu
0.33 -1.67 -2.07 0.13 -2.40 1.33 -2.20 -1.87 0.27 2.40 -1.60 -0.20 1.20 -2.73 -2.80 -2.40
-0.47 0.40 0.00 -1.47 2.47 -1.27 1.67 0.87 -1.53 -1.53 2.07 0.80 -2.40 2.07 2.0 1.27
0.27.6 1.53.20 0.872.07 -0.400.93 0.53. 3 -0.870.53 0.001.4 1.000.2 -1.000.93 -0.270.80 0.80-0.27 -1.530.87 0.070.80 0.731.47 0.800.2 1.532.13
1.13 1.00 1.53 0.20 1.40 0.53 0.20 0.73 0.47 0.27 0.47 -0.07 1.60 0.73 0.87 1.33
12 Shall. Deep -0.53 -1.60 -2.53 -1.87 -1.93 0.47 -1.73 -1.73 -1.87 -1.00 -1.47 -1.67 -1.33 -2.27 -1.93 -2.80
134 Strongl w WeakFast 0.27 1.87 1.60 0.33 1.93 -1.20 1.73 0.40 0.67 -1.53 1.20 0.87 1.27 2.40 1.80 2.67
-1.13 -0.67 -1.80 0.07 -0.47 0.07 0.53 -0.27 -0.13 -0.8 -0.40 -0.53 0.0 0.20 -0.87 -0.53
15 Soft Hard -1.80 0.0 -1.27 -1.33 -0.33 -1.07 -0.27 1.00 -0.40 -0.40 1.27 -0.40 -1.53 0.27 0.80 0.60
1678 Emot.Hum.Neg Rat.SerPos. 0.67 1.73 0.47 0.47 -0.33 0.47 -0.53 0.73 1.80 2.40 1.80 -0.53 2.00 0.47 -0.07 1.67-2.73 -1.73 -1.20 -2.47 0.00 -2.80 -2.07 -0.13 -2.00 -2.87 -0.27 -2.20 -2.47 -1.27 0.60 -1.40
-0.87 -1.93 -2.13 -0.4 -2.07 0.93 -1.87 -1.20 0.07 0.47 -1.67 -2.07 -1.13 -2.13 -2.27 -2.40
19 Int. Bor. 1.13 2.27 2.93 0.60 2.00 1.00 2.47 1.20 1.00 1.47 1.93 1.67 0.07 2.27 2.67 2.40
20 Free Const. 0.13 1.20 0.47 -0.80 -0.27 -0.27 1.00 -0.13 -0.87 -1.07 0.00 1.27 -0.67 1/27 2.47 1.13
EXij2
62.503.5559.2942.8251.1043.653.999. 112.941 .3113.650 607.297 734.4624.5657.313.2955.9216.43












































































































































































































43.6553.999.9112. 41 .3113.6150.607.297 731 .4624.565 .313.2955.926.43 5.196.085.522.360. 8.341.752.14-0.111. 8- .25-3.623.22 0.77 3.383.721.03..86.026.894.08-1.69-0. 4.25. 5.296 460
Voar.D.I
92.18
77.32100.0012 147 . 561.7268.4876.3543.0441. 86.0512.28.0717.296 352 .8624. 69 46. 8
1Total
Var=37.56
6.0844.0659.7164. 37 . 26.821°/Total
YoVar.DII
8.03
9.680.006 .353 7226.1625.63197.1667.0193.9544. 53 . 6
Var-36.43
Y>Resid.Var
13.000.21.513.232. 25 89. 94 .7722.4332.1100.0043 76 .36.639.597.43.8115. 246.04Total
Var-26.01
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'e' values were 0.99 and 0.97 for Dimensions I and II respectively.
It was now possible to advance with the knowledge that anj>- dif¬
ferences that might be found between the Neurotics and Normals with
respect to the meanings of the concepts, could not be attributed to
differences between the groups with respect to the meanings of the
scales.
The Meaning of the Concepts: Normals versus Neurotics
The co-ordinate values of the concepts were determined by
summing and averaging the mean concept ratings on those scales
selected as most representative of each dimension. For Dimension I
(Evaluation), the scales selected were "nappy-sad', 'beautiful-ugly',
'good-bad', and 'safe-dangerous'; the scales 'deep-shallow', 'sharp-
dull', 'large-small' and 'interesting-boring' were considered most
representative of Dimension II (Potency). The co-ordinate values
obtained through this procedure are presented in Table 13. The
Concept-Origin values, which are also shown, constitute the focus of
interest in this study.
The application of Wilcoxon's Sign Rank Test of Differences to
the Class 'A' Concept-Origin distances produced a T-value of zero,
since all differences are in the same direction. Since the probability
of this occurring by chance is exactly one in five hundred and twelve
(P = .002), it seems reasonable to reject the hypothesis that no real
differences exist between the groups. It would appear that those
personal and social concepts that are favourably rated by normal female
students receive less favourable ratings from those females that have
neurotic personalities as measured by the Rorschach.
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TABLE 13
CONCEPT CO-ORDINATE VALUES AND ORIGIN-CONCEPT DISTANCES:




DI DII Distance DI DII Distance
"A" Concepts
Intercourse 2.00 1.59 2.56 1.12 1.52 1.89
Life 1.80 2.08 2.57 1.13 2.27 2.54
Father 2.10 1.35 2.50 1.93 1.47 2.43
Religion 1.78 1.65 2.43 1.75 1.45 2.27
My Real Self 1.24 1.25 1.76 0.75 0.97 1.23
Mother 2.25 1.64 2.96 1.89 0.90 2.32
Marriage 2.17 1.90 2.88 1.80 1.69 2.47
My Ideal Self 2.22 1.74 2.82 2.23 1.42 2.64
Love 2.23 2.29 3.22 2.08 2.17 3.01
"E" Concepts
C. Punish -1.12 0.78 1.37 -1.00 0.87 1.33
Guilt -1.45 1.22 1.90 -1.80 0.80 2.01
Divorce -1.82 1.12 2.14 -2.20 0.40 2.24
Fear -1.73 1.32 2.22 -1.63 1.07 1.99
Suicide -2.55 1.45 2.93 -2.25 0.89 2.42
Death 0.07 1.47 1.47 0.040 1.04 1.12
Hate -2.69 1.05 2.89 -2.63 0.95 2.80
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DISCUSSION
Perhaps the most important feature of findings is that the
statistical significance of the differences found between Normals
and Neurotics does not depend on a one-tailed test. If no hypothesis
concerning the direction of differences had been advanced, the P value
of .004, based on a two-tailed test is still highly significant.
The conclusion that there are apparently real differences between
Normals and Neurotics with respect to their ratings of so-called
positively-valued concepts, is in itself of some value. That it was
possible to predict the direction of the differences, constitutes a
certain degree of support for the theory advanced in the introduction
to this particular study.
The differences between the two groups are illustrated by the
graph in Figure 10. Here the co-ordinate values of the concepts in
Table 13 have been plotted in a semantic space defined by the two
dimensions, Evaluation and Potency. It will be observed that the
differences between the corresponding Class A concept pairs show
some variability. It may be that while the Neurotics have attached
a greater degree of ambivalence to these concepts as a whole, the
severity of this reaction varies with the concept rated.
The findings lend themselves to a second interpretation. Is
it possible that the differences between the Normals and Neurotics are
attributable to some factor or factors other than ambivalence? For
example, the concept 'Intercourse' may have received its comparatively
low rating because it aroused only moderately positive reactions in
the Neurotics. Here the underlying factor would not be one of conflict,




















mA" concepts. Such a possibility was regarded as unlikely unless
the validity of the classification "Neurotics" were suspect. Since
the Maudsley Personality Inventory (9) had been administered to all
subject in this study (purely.as a matter of interest) it was de¬
cided to follow up this question. A check of both the Neuroticism and
Extraversion scores of the (Rorschach) Normals and Neurotics revealed
the interesting pattern presented in Table 13- When the M.P.I, high
Neuroticism scores and low Neuroticism scores were compared with the




(1) High Neur.:Low Extr. (Dysthymics)
(2) High Nur.: High Extr. (Hysterics)
10
3
(3) Total Neurotics ( (1) + (2) ) 10 3
(4) Low Neur: Low Extr. (Normals)





(6) Total Normals ( (4) + (5) ) 5 12
Rorschach Normals and Neurotics in a 2 x 2 contingency table the
'V 2
resulting value of 4.68 (with Yates' correction) was signi¬
ficant with P < .05. This suggested a fair measure of agreement
between the Rorschach and the M.P.I, with respect to the classification
of Neurotics and Normals. However when the Extraversion scores were
dichotomized arid a new 2x2 contingency table was set up, the chi-
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square test (A® = 19•20) of the null hypothesis was again rejected
at less than the 1 per cent level of confidence. These findings
suggested that the Rorschach neurotic is more likely to be an M.F.I,
dysthymic than an hysteric, and the Rorschach noma! is more likely
to be an M.P.I. Extravert than an Introvert. In the light of this
it appeared that if the Maudsley Personality Inventory were used as
a criterion of neurosis, such differences as had been found between
the Rorschach neurotic and normal groups with respect to the Semantic
Differential Scale used in this study would be attributable to both
neuroticism and introversion. This conclusion suggested a second
study employing the Maudsley Personality Inventory as a criterion
of both neuroticism and introversion.
CHAPTER VII
STUDY III
A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NORMAL,
DYSTHYMIC AND HYSTERIC SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS..
The results of the previous study suggested that both neuro-
ticism and introversion are associated with relatively weak ratings
of positively valued concepts as compared with normals and extraverts.
From this position a number of hypotheses, relating to the intensity
of ratings of positively valued, concepts, can be advanced.
H 1 Neurotics will produce ratings that are consistently less
intense than those of normals:. -
H2 Introverts will produce ratings that are consistently less
• intense than those of extraverts.
H3 Neurotic introverts (Dysthymics) will produce ratings that
are consistently less intense than those of neurotic extra¬
verts (Hysterics).
H4 Normal introverts will produce ratings that are consistently
less intense than those of normal extraverts.
H5 Neurotics introverts (Dysthymics) will produce ratings that
.are consistently less intense than those of normal introverts.
H6 Neurotic extraverts (Hysterics) will produce ratings that
are consistently less intense than those of normal extraverts.
H7 Neurotic introverts (Dysthymics) will give consistently less
intense ratings than will normal extraverts.
118 Normal introverts and neurotic extraverts will not differ in
the intensities of their ratings.
PROCEDURE
The Maudsley Personality Inventory (9) was administered to 82
unmarried female students enrolled in a first-year psychology course
at the University of Edinburgh. This test purports to measure two
%
orthogonal dimensions of personality, extraversion-introversion and
neuroticism. According to Eysenck (17, p.58), there seems to be a
fair amount of agreement among personality theorists on the following
points concerning extraverts and. introverts: the introvert has a
more subjective outlook than the extravert; the introvert shows a
higher degree of cerebral activity and self control (inhibition)
than the extravert. Eysenck (17, p.49) identifies neuroticism with
a lack of personality organization and characterized by low sociability
(17, p.53), high suggestibility, low persistence and either very high
or very low perseveration (17, p.256). The M.P.I, attempts to identify
two types of neuroses, in which both neuroticism and extraversion -
introversion are the principal descriptive.parameters. The first of
these is dysthymia, a neurosis characterized by anxiety, reactive
depression, and obsessional tendencies (17, p.246). The dysthymic
describes himself as having feelings that are easily hurt; as being
self-conscious, nervous and given to feelings of inferiority; moody,
prone to day-dreaming and withdrawal on social occasions. On vocabu¬
lary tests dysthymics tend to do extremely well. Their levels of
aspiration are unduly high, but they tend to under-rate their own
performance. The second type of neurosis is hysteria, which is
characterized by a tendency to develop hysterical conversion symptoms.
Hysterics show little energy and have narrow interests. They describe
themselves as being troubled by stammering or stuttering, as being
accident-prone, disgruntled and troubled by aches and pains. On
vocabulary tests they tend to do rather poorly. Their level of aspira¬
tion is low but they tend to over-rate their performances. (17, p.24-7).
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Eysenck's work has been the subject of a number of critical
investigations. Foulds (23) and Foulds and Caine (24, 25) suggest
that personality questionnaires.of the type used by Eysenck fail to
take account of the difference between symptom-clusters (syndromes)
and trait-clusters (personality types). These authors claim that
the hysteric may exhibit either a hysteroid or an obsessive personality,
and that the dysthymic may also fall into either category. Foulds
and Caine found that some psychological tests differentiate between
hysterics and dysthymics regardless of personality type, while still
other tests differentiated between hysteroids and obsessives, regard¬
less of diagnostic classification. Sigal, Star and Franks (62) found
that Eysenck's Extraversion and Neuroticism Scales do not retain ortho¬
gonality in hysteria and dysthymia; that hysterics have lower neuro¬
ticism scores than do dysthymics, and that hysterics not only fail to
be more extraverted than normals, but actually have higher introversion
scores. McGuire, Mowbray and Vallance (48) report findings that con¬
stitute both direct and indirect support for the studies cited above.
These investigators administered the Maudsley Personality Inventory
to an unselected group of psychiatric patients. All diagnostic groups
were differentiated from normals on the Neuroticism Scale but neither
the Neuroticism nor the Extraversion Scales permitted differentiation
between the diagnostic groups. Of particular interest is their finding
that hysterics and dysthymics were not differentiated on the Extraversion
Scale.
In the face of this criticism, Eysenck and Claridge (19) tested
three groups: normals, hysterics and dysthymics. Factor analysis and
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discriminant function analysis of objective laboratory tests and
questionnaires administered to all subjects revealed that hysterics
are apparently extraverted and neurotic while dysthyraics are intro¬
verted and neurotic. Eysenck and Claridge found however that while
perfect discrimination between hysterics and dysthymics was obtained,
an analysis of the questionnaire scores indicated a departure from
linearity of regression of introversion and neuroticism scores at
the upper end of the respective scales.
In attempting to reconcile their findings with those of Foulds
and Caine, Eysenck and Claridge argue that introversion and extraversion
have been used in a misleading way. They maintain that a constitutional
extravert (an individual in whom the innate balance of excitation and
inhibition in the central nervous system is tilted in the direction
of high inhibition and low excitation) may, through the process of
learning, develop introverted traits. Similarly a constitutional
introvert may behave like an extrovert. The Maudsley Personality
Inventory, Eysenck and Claridge suggest, may be a good measure of
behavioural rather than constitutional extraversion. They do not stress
the point, however, that if the M.P.I, cannot discriminate between
constitutional and behavioural introverts and extraverts, its effective¬
ness as a test is substantially reduced.
In a later study, Eysenck and Eysenck (20) administered a
questionnaire containing all of the M.P.I, items to groups of subjects
rated by judges for extraversion, introversion, normality and neuro¬
ticism. A close agreement was found between self-rated and judge-rated
behaviour for extraversion. Little agreement was obtained with respect
to neuroticism --a finding which Eysenck and Eysenck attribute to a
failure on the part of the judges to differentiate between intro¬
verted and neurotic shyness.
From this review of the related literature, it is evident
that the concurrent validity of the M.P.I, is still subject to
question. The designation of the different groups in this study is
made, therefore, with great reservation. With this in mind, tentative
acceptance was made of Eysenck's claim that dysthymics tend to score
high on the Neuroticism Scale but low on the Extraversion Scale, while
hysterics score highly on both Scales. For the purposes of this study
it was necessary to obtain four groups of subjects: one Dysthymic (High
N, Low E,); one Hysteric (High N, High E.); one Normal Introvert (Low
N, Low E,); and one Normal Extravert (Low N, High E). For the purposes
of obtaining distinctive classifications it would have been desirable
to select only those cases that falling at least 1 sigma above and below
the means of the respective scales in Eysenck's standardization samples
(16, p.5), it was found that in our sample of 32 cases, some modification
of this criterion was necessary in order to obtain enough subjects to
carry out an analysis. The maximum number of cases in each group was
restricted to 5. Table 15 shows the scores of each subject in the dif¬
ferent groups. Eysenck's standardization data for,each classification
are also included to facilitate comparisons.
The Semantic Differential Scale used in the previous study was
administered individually to each of the twenty subjects. The mean
raw score matrices for each of the four groups are presented in Tables
16(a), 16(b), 16(c) and 16(d). It might have sufficed to utilize only
those eight scales whose dimensional characteristics had been established




INVENTORY SCORES: NORMALS v. NEUROTICS
GROUP DESCRIPTION SUBJECT N-SCORE E-SCORE EYSENCK DATA
Normals 1 12 15 N mean = 19.89
a( Low N, Low E 2 16 14 N C = 11.02
3 8 16 E mean = 24.91
4 16 17 E C = 9.71
5 11 18
Normals 1 12 38




Neurotic 1 38 16 N mean = 38.18
(Dysthymics) 2 36 8 N CT = 10.84
a) High N, Low E 3 40 16 E mean = 17.86
4 39 18 EC = 10.02
5 32 8
Neurotic 1 43 37 N mean = 30.82
(Hysterics) 2 42 32 N CT = 11.84
b) High N, High E 3 32 34 E mean = 24-91
4 30 38 E CT = 9.26
5 38 40
TABLE16(a)MEANRAWSCOREM T IX-NORMALINT OV RTS
N=5
123456789101234516
C.PunInterc.LifeG iltFatherD vor.R ligal.S.arSuicMotherDe thH e.Id alL ve
Beaut.-Ugly- Good-Ba Happy-S d Passive-Act. Relaxed-T nse Clean-Dirty Sick-Healthy Safe-D ng. Hot-Cold Large-Small Sharp-Dull Deep-Shallow Strong-Weak Slow-Fast Soft-Hard Emot.-Ra Hum.-Serious Neg.-Positive Int.-Boring Free-Constr.
-1.60 +1.20 -1.00 -2.00 -2.00 0.80 -1.20 0.20 1.00 0.20 1.00 +1.20 1.80 -1.00 -2.40 -0.60 -2.80 -2.00 0.40 -0.80
1.40 +1.60 1.80 -1.40 0.40 1.40 -1.80 0.60 1.00 0.40 0.40 +1.20 1.20 0 -0.40 1.60 -1.20 -0.20 0.80 0.20
2.0 +2.20 2.00 -2.60 0 1.60 -2.20 0.20 0.60 1.20 1.00 +2.20 2.0 -0.8 -0.40 0.80 0 -2.20 3.00 1.80
-2.60 -1.60 -2.00 -0.80 -1.60 -0.40 -0.40 -1.20 -0.60 0.80 1.20 +1.60 1.20 0.40 -1.00 0.80 -3.00 -1.60 0.40 -0.60
1.40 +2.40 2.40 -1.40 0.40 2.0 -2.20 1.80 0.80 0.20 0.40 +2.00 2.0 -0.20 -0.80 -1.00 0 -1.80 2.00 0.20
-2.60 -2.80 -3.00 -1.40 -2.80 -0.80 1.20 -1.60 -0.40 0 0.40 +0.8 -0.40 -0.40 -0.60 1.60 -3.00 -1.20 0.60 1.00
1.80 +2.80 1.40 -1.60 0.60 2.00 -2.00 2.40 0.20 1.60 1.20 +2.40 2.00 0.60 -0.6 -0.8 -1.80 -2.20 2.00 1.40
0.40 +1.20 1.80 -1.40 0.40 2.40 -2.40 1.80 0.40 -0.40 0.40 +1.60 1.60 0 1.00 0.60 0 -0.80 0.60 -0.20
-2.60 -1.00 -1.40 -1.00 -2.80 -0.20 0.60 -1.00 -0.80 0.60 1.00 +2.00 1.80 -0.40 -1.60 1.80 -2.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.40
-3.00 -2.80 -3.00 -2.00 -2.60 -0.80 2.60 -1.80 -1.00 0.20 1.20 +1.20 -2.60 -0.40 -2.00 2.60 -3.00 -1.20 0.60 1.40
2.20 +2.40 2.40 -2.20 -0.20 2.40 -2.00 2.0 1.00 -0.60 0.20 +1.60 1.60 -0.20 0.20 1.40 -0.40 -1.20 2.20 0
-0.4 +0.6 -2.20 0.60 0.80 1.00 -0.40 0.20 -1.40 1.40 1.00 +1.80 1.40 -0.2 -2.20 0.60 -2.20 -1.60 1.20 1.40
-3.00 -2.80 -2.20 -2.40 -2.60 -1.60 1.40 -3.00 0 0.80 1.40 +1.80 1.20 0 -1.40 2.60 -3.00 -1.00 0.40 0
2.20 +2.60 2.60 -2.20 1.00 2.00 -2.80 2.20 0.80 1.60 1.20 +2.40 2.60 -0.60 -0.60 0.60 -0.80 -2.00 2.0 1.60
1.80 +2.40 2.80 -1.60 2.60 2.60 -3.00 1.20 0.80 0 0.80 +2.20 2.60 -0.60 -0.20 0 0.80 -1.80 2.60 2.00
2.60 +2.00 2.80 -2.20 1.00 2.00 -2.40 0.60 1.20 1.80 1.20 +3.00 2.80 -0.40 0 2.00 -0.80 -1.80 1.80 2.00
TABLE16(b)MEANRAWSCOREM T IX-DYS HYMICO(HIGHNEUROT CISM-LOWXT AVERSSON)
N=5
12345678910123
C.PunInterc.LifeGuiltFath rD vo .R l gal.S.FearStlicMotherDe thH e
1456 Marr.IdealS.Love
Beaut.-Ugly Good-Ba Happy-S d Passive-Acti Relaxed-T nse Clean-Dirty Sick-Healthy Safe-D ng. Hot-Cold Large-Small Sharp-Dull Deep-Shallow Strong-Weak Slow-Fast Soft-Hard Emot.-Rat Hum.-Serious Neg.-Positive Int.-Boring Free-Constr.
-2.20 -0.20 -2.40 -0.60 -2.20 -1.20 1.00 -1.00 0.40 0.40 1.60 +0.8 -0.20 -1.40 -1.00 1.40 -2.80 1.40 2.00 -0.60
0.80 +1.00 0.40 -2.20 0.20 1.20 -1.40 0.40 2.20 1.40 1.60 +1.20 2.40 -1.00 -0.40 2.80 -2.60 -2.60 2.80 1.40
1.40 +1.40 -0.20 -2.80 -2.00 0.40 -1.20 -1.00 1.40 2.00 1.20 +2.40 1.80 -2.00 -1.80 1.60 -2.20 -1.80 2.80 -0.60
-2.80 -2.20 -2.80 0.60 -2.80 -1.40 1.00 -2.60 -1.00 0.80 -1.60 +1.60 -1.20 0.60 -0.80 1.60 -2.60 2.80 1.60 -2.20
1.60 +2.40 0.80 -1.60 -2.20 2.00 -2.20 0.20 0.40 0.40 1.40 +1.20 1.80 -0.80 -1.40 0.40 -1.20 -1.60 2.40 -1.60
-1.80 -1.80 -2.80 -0.20 -2.20 -1.00 1.80 -1.80 -0.60 -0.40 0.40 +1.00 -1.00 -0.40 -1.00 0 -2.60 2.80 1.60 -0.20
1.20 +1.60 0.40 -0.60 0 1.60 -1.00 1.00 -0.80 0.60 -0.8 -0.20 0.40 -0.20 0.20 1.00 -2.00 -0.80 2.40 -0.60
1.00 +1.40 -0.80 -1.40 -1.60 1.40 -1.20 -0.40 1.20 0.40 1.00 +2.40 -0.20 -0.40 0 0.40 -1.00 -1.40 1.80 -0.40
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+2.80 2.00 -1.80 1.20 2.00 -2.60 1.80 0.40 0.80 0.20 +2.20 1.80 -0.20 0.80 0.20 -0.80 -2.00 1.80 1.00
+1.20 2.40 -0.80 3.00 2.60 -2.60 2.20 1.40 -0.20 0.80 +1.20 1.60 -1.40 0.60 -0.20 0.00 -2.80 2.60 3.00
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-2.00 -1.80 -2.20 -2.60 -2.80 -0.40 1.00 0.40 0.80 0.20 0.80 0 -1.20 -1.40 -2.00 0.80 -2.80 -1.60 2.00 -0.40
1.40 +2.20 2.60 -3.00 0.80 1.80 -1.60 1.20 1.60 0.20 1.20 +2.40 2.00 -0.60 0.80 2.20 -2.60 -2.80 2.80 1.60
2.40
+2.60 2.40 -2.80 0.80 2.20 -2.60 0.40 0.80 0.80 2.0 +3.00 1.60 -2.60 -0.80 -0.2 -0.60 -2.80 3.00 1.60
-1.00 -0.40 -1.20 -1.40 -2.40 0.40 0.20 0 1.00 0.40 1.00 +2.20 0.40 0.40 -1.60 -0.20 -2.40 -1.40 0.40 -0.40
1.80 +2.40 2.40 -2.60 2.40 2.80 -2.60 2.80 0.20 -0.20 1.60 +2.20 1.60 -0.60 1.00 -1.00 0.40 -2.60 2.00 1.20
-2.00 -1.80 -2.80 -1.60 -2.60 -0.60 1.80 -1.20 0.40 0.80 1.00 +1.40 -2.20 0.20 -1.80 0.60 -3.00 -1.60 1.60 0
2.0 +2.40 2.00 -1.20 0.60 1.00 -1.80 1.20 0.40 0.60 1.40 +2.40 1.40 0.40 0.20 -1.20 -2.60 -1.80 2.20 1.40
0.60 +1.40 2.40 -1.80 1.60 2.80 -2.80 2.20 0.80 0.80 1.60 +2.40 1.20 -1.20 1.00 0.40 0 -1.80 2.20 1.20
-1.60 -1.80 -2.40 -0.60 -3.00 -0.80 0.60 -2.60 -1.40 1.20 0.80 +2.00 1.60 -0.60 -1.00 2.60 -2.80 -0.60 1.00 -1.40
-3.00 -2.80 -3.00 -2.00 -3.00 -1.20 2.40 -2.40 0.20 0.80 2.20 +2.20 -1.60 -1.60 -1.60 2.60 -3.00 -2.00 1.40 -0.60
1.80 +2.60 2.00 -2.40 -0.80 3.00 -1.20 2.40 0.60 0.60 1.20 +2.60 2.40 -0.8 1.60 2.40 0 -2.80 2.40 1.60
0.60 +1.00 -1.20 0.60 2.20 1.20 0 1.20 -1.00 0.40 0 +3.00 1.80 -1.00 -0.6 -0.80 -2.80 -3.00 3.00 -0.40
-2.80 -2.60 -3.00 -2.80 -3.00 -1.40 1.80 -2.80 1.20 1.20 2.60 +2.80 1.60 -1.20 -2.20 2.80 -2.80 -1.80 0.40 -1.40
2.40 +2.40 2.80 -2.80 2.40 3.00 -3.00 1.60 1.00 0.60 1.20 +2.40 2.0 0.20 1.00 0.80 -2.40 -2.40 2.40 160
2.40 +2.40 2.80 -3.00 2.80 3.00 -3.00 1.60 0.80 0.20 2.00 +2.80 2.20 -1.20 0.60 -0.80 1.40 -2.40 1.60 2.80
3.00 +3.00 2.40 -2.60 1.80 2.60 -2.80 1.00 1.80 1.80 1.20 +2.80 3.00 -1.60 0.40 2.00 -2.40 -2.80 3.00 1.40
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'beautiful-ugly* and 'safe-dangerous' representing Evaluation;
'deep-shallow', 'interesting-boring', 'large-small' and 'sharp-dull'
representing Potency). However, as a check on the dimensional stability
9
of scales across subjects, it was decided to repeat the D analyses,
but confine these analyses to the combined Neurotics (Dysthyiaics and
Hysterics) and the combined Normals (Extraverts and Introverts) re¬
spectively. This arrangement yielded two matrices of mean raw scores,
each based on N = 10, and these are presented in Tables 17(a) and 17(b).
2
D analyses were then carried out on each matrix. The results of these
analyses are presented in Table 18. As in the Rorschach study, only
two dimensions accounted for the greater proportions of scale variances.
The Evaluative dimension again predominated with Potency assuming a
minor role. There was, however, a slight difference between the two
studies with respect to the dominant scales. While 'beautiful-ugly',
'good-bad', and 'happy-sad' are again strongly evaluative, 'safe-
dangerous' was selected in preference to 'relaxed-tense' whose dimen¬
sional characteristics proved to be somewhat ambiguous since 32.01%
and 40.26% of the respective variances for Normals and Neurotics re¬
mained unknown. With respect to the Potency dimension, 'deep-shallow',
'large-small', 'interesting-boring' and 'sharp-dull' again emerged
as the most representative scales.
The last step in the procedure was to obtain mean concept ratings
by summing and averaging the raw score ratings on each of the four
scales representing Dimension I (Evaluation). This procedure was re¬
peated with the four scales representing Dimension II (Potency). From
these mean co-ordinate values, all concept-origin values were computed
directly.
TABLE17(a)MEANRAWSCOREM T IX
TOTALN RM LS(INTROVERTS&EXT AVER S)
N=10 C.Pun
Inter Life Guilt Father Divor. Relig. RealS. Fear Suicide Mother Death Hate Marr. Ideal5. Love
123 Beaut.dH ppy UglyGoodSa -1.80 1.40 2.30 -1.80 1.60 -2.30 2.00 0.50 -2.10 -3.00 2.00 0.10 -2.90 2.30 2.10 2.800.30 -1.90 -2.40 1.00 -2.40 2.30 -2.60 -1.30 1.40 2.80 -2.50 -0.8 2.70 -2.50 -2.40 -2.50
-1.60 2.20 2.20 -1.60 2.40 -2.90 1.70 2.10 -1.90 -3.00 2.20 1.70 -2.60 2.70 2.80 2.60
4 Pass. Act. -2.30 -2.20 -2.70 -1.10 -2.00 -1.50 -1.40 -1.60 -0.80 -2.00 -2.30 0.60 -2.60 -2.50 -2.30 -2.40
5 Relax Tense -2.40 0.60 0.40 -2.00 1.40 -2.70 0.60 1.00 -2.90 -2.80 —0.50 1.50 -2.80 1.70 2.70 1.40
6 Clean Dirty 0.20 1.60 1.90 0.00 2.50 0.70 1.50 2.60 -0.50 -1.00 2.70 1.10 -1.50 2.50 -2.80 2.30
789101
SickafeHotL rgeSharp Heal.Dang.ColdSmallDu
12345 Shall.trongSl wft DeepW akFastH rd
1678920 Emot.HumNeg.InFree Rat.SerPos.B rC nst.
-0.10 -1.70 -2.40 -0.10 -2.40 1.50 -1.90 -2.60 0.60 2.50 -1.60 -0.20 1.60 -2.90 -3.00 -2.60
0.30 0.90 0.30 -0.60 2.30 -1.40 1.80 2.00 -1.80 -2.10 2.30 0.70 -2.90 1.90 1.40 0.80
0.90 1.30 0.70 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.60 -1.10 -0.40 0.80 -1.20 0.60 0.90 0.80 1.50
0.20 0.30 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.40 1.10 0.20 0.90 0.50 0.00 0.90 1.00 1.10 0.10 1.80
0.90 0.80 1.60 1.10 1.00 0.70 1.30 1.00 0.90 1.70 0.70 0.50 2.00 -1.20 1.40 1.20
-0.60 -1.80 -2.60 -1.90 -2.10 -1.10 -2.40 -2.00 -2.00 -1.70 -2.10 -2.40 -2.30 -2.40 -2.50 -2.90
0.30 1.60 1.90 0.80 1.90 -1.30 1.70 1.40 1.70 -2.10 2.00 1.60 1.40 2.40 2.40 2.90
-1.20 -0.30 -1.70 0.40 -0.40 -0.10 0.50 -0.60 -0.50 -1.00 -0.50 -0.60 -0.60 -0.20 -0.90 -1.00
-2.20 0.20 -0.60 -1.30 0.10 -1.20 -0.20 1.00 -1.30 -1.80 0.90 -1.40 -1.80 0.20 0.20 0.20
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C.Pun.-2.100.10- .-0.92 00-0.65 503.1 - .80- .243- .402 60.1 5- .60 Inter.1.40-1.605-2.40.2-1.80701 6-1.40.8- .90.42 3-2 204.51 Life1.90-1.90.0-2.70-1.700.8- .31 67-2.302. 1.901 8-2.22.60 Guilt-2.501.50-2.400 2-2.3010. 8- .9- .50-1.70.3-1.50.9 2+ 41. -2. 0 Father1.60-2.204-1.9- .402.32 110 6.78- .201 5-0.76.40 3- .902. - .50 Divor.-1.801.10-2.2-0.92 10- .8.21 40- .50 51. - .400 54-0 5020.1 - .60 Relig.1.40—-1.602-0.9.07-1.200 21. 0-0.50.840 - 301 12. RealS.0.70-1.004- .7-1.501 8 91.0.41 3- .90. - .82- 0071.0 Fear-2.701.701 83-2.7090.11- .501.7-2. 00 9-0 92. -2.40- .401.5- .60 Suicide-1.501.60-2 40 2-2.80 92. 1 401.40 8-1.80-1.400 1.2.32 70 91 8- .70 Mother2.00-2.201 61 9- .802.01 640 5- .3-1.30.4-0.901 760 62.0 3 Death0.50-0.501 7.71 321-2.000. -2.205-1.0 841.34 Hate-2.602.50-2.30-1.90-2.761 6 80.04-1.402. -2.52 701. - .30 Marr.2.00-2.501.9-2.102 4800.4-2.201 97.0.6- .621 9 IdealS.2.30-1.902.4-1.60.65-2.50010 3-1.608- .50. -0 102 62 6.5 Love2.70-2.501 6-2.700.12 -2.5059-2.70.30 32.4-2.10-2.6.61 61.6150.943.4945.7253.0040 265.532 82 329 1548. 683 74.186 .41 4318 1
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NORMALS EXij2 (1)Cli (2)cm
69.207285 663.7559 62342.994 811 20 32. 87 .128040. 84 6368. 055 47740. 2 7.9049 233.016.1657 05 62 30.32. 44 5-0.483. 9-1.1-3. 3.253 3 0.021 7027. 9-1.613 632 80.441 2.74 58. 32-2.09-2.313.716 6. 41
(3)War.DimI
90.1987 311 0.004.263 658 282 97 04 .31 78259. 3445 .104 114 37 82 . 25 . 0
(4)War.DimII
0.00483.36.3424 7112.990.01.1273 189. 891.755 86 34.077366. 18 271 623. 7
(5)%Resid.Var.
9.818 690 002.4332.016 74.722 . 64 495 28 640 01 .51 .836 618. 8722 .13
NEUROTICS EXij2 (1)Cli (2)cm
61.6150.943 4945.725 000 26.532 82 .329 1548. 62.21 823 741861.4318. 1 7.256.10322.264 9.64.922 50 80. 50-0.923.431- .92518. 3 1.582 700.05.57-2.733 141 360.9066.954 19-1. 1-1.2950.4 8341.28
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85.3173 05100.0011 1845 661. 047 6775.42 812 34 25. 1649 282.83 . 3643.04
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4.0614.310 067.8514. 62 .490 018. 07 9666. 899. 754 4574952.305 17.7
(5)96Resid.Var.
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RESULTS
The data derived from the final step in the procedure are pre¬
sented in Tables 19, 20 and 21. Although the hypotheses concern the
concept--origin distances of the "A" (positively valued) concepts only
the "B" (unpleasant) concept co-ordinate and concept-origin distances
are also included as a matter of interest. Each of the eight major
hypotheses in this study was tested by application of the Sign Test
to the appropriate sets of concept-origin distances. The results are
as folloxtfs:
H 1 (Neurotics versus Normals): 8 of 9 differences
in predicted direction (P = .02). Significant.
H2 (Introverts versus Extraverts): 8 of 9 differences
in predicted direction (P = .02). Significant.
113 (Dysthymics versus Hysterics): 7 of 8 differences
in predicted direction (P <C•05). Significant.
H4 (Normal Introverts versus Normal Extraverts):
7 of 9 differences in predicted direction (P /i .10).
Non-significant.
H5 (Dysthymics versus Normal Introverts): 6 of 9
differences in predicted direction (P .30).
Non-significant.
116 (Hysterics versus normal Extraverts): 9 of 9
differences in predicted direction (P = .002).
Significant.
H7 (Dysthymics versus Normal Extraverts): 9 of 9
differences in predicted direction (P = .002).
Significant.
H8 (Normal introverts versus Hysterics): 7 of 9
differences in same direction (p .20).
Non-significant.
TABLE 19




D 1 D II
Distance
to





Intercourse 1.60 1.18 1.99 1.30 1.58 2.05
Life 1.30 2.10 2.77 1.13 2.10 2.38
Father 2.18 1.28 2.53 1.63 1.28 2.07
Religion 2.03 1.73 2.67 1.40 0.88 1.65
My Real Self 1.48 1.15 1.37 0.50 1.33 1.42
Mother 2.25 1.28 2.59 1.80 0.88 2.00
Marriage 2.35 1.75 2.93 2.10 1.35 2.50
My Ideal Self 2.18 >1.53 2.66 2.15 1.38 2.55
Love 2.18 2.08 3.01 1.83 2.33 2.96
"B" Concepts
C. Punish -0.85 0.73 1.12 -1.20 1.08 1.61
Guilt -1.25 1.00 1.60 -2.10 0.75 2.23
Divorce -2.13 0.83 2.29 -1.63 1.08 1.96
Fear -1.80 1.20 2.16 -1.98 1.35 2.40
Suicide -2.73 1.23 2.99 -1.73 1.45 2.26
Death -0.03 1.48 1.48 -0.05 1.23 1.23
Hate -2.78 1.43 3.13 -2.55 1.25 2.84
TABLE 20
CONCEPT COORDINATE VALUES AND ORIGIN - CONCEPT DISTANCES :
EXTRAVERTS (NEUROTIC & NORMAL) VERSUS INTROVERTS (NEUROTIC & NORMAL)
M.P.I. CRITERION
INTROVERTS EXTRAVERTS
D I D II Distance D I D II Distance
to Origin to Origin
"A" Concepts
Intercourse 1.00 1.23 1.59 1.85 1.53 2.40
Life 1.03 1.98 2.23 1.90 2.18 2.89
Father 1.63 1.25 2.05 2.18 1.30 2.54
Religion 1.58 1.15 1.95 1.85 1.45 2.35
My Real Self 0.80 0.98 1.26 1.18 1.50 1.91
Mother 1.86 0.50 1.93 2.18 1.15 2.46
Marriage 2.30 1.55 2.77 2.10 1.55 2.61
My Ideal Self 2.08 1.25 2.43 2.28 1.65 2.81
Love 1.80 2.28 2.90 2.33 2.15 3.17
"B" Concepts
C. Punish -0.88 0.95 1.29 -1.18 1.35 1.79
Guilt -2.23 0.80 2.37 -1.08 1.18 1.60
Divorce -2.15 0.55 2.22 -1.58 1.35 2.08
Fear -1.98 1.05 2.24 -1.80 1.50 2.34
Suicide -2.23 0.95 2.42 -2.23 1.73 2.82
Death -0.50 1.33 1.42 0.43 1.38 1.45
Hate -2.85 1.03 3.03 -2.48 1.65 2.98
TABLE21



































































































































































































































Although the total neurotic group and the total introvert groups
tend to produce consistently lower ratings than the normals and the
extraverts respectively, it would appear that the influence of intro¬
version and neuroticism varies with the particular ways in which they
are combined. Dysthymics (introverted neurotics) rate consistently
lower than hysterics (extraverted neurotics), but normal introverts
do not rate significantly lower than normal extraverts. Hysterics
produce consistently lower ratings than normal extraverts but the
differences between dysthymics and normal introverts show no signifi¬
cant trend in either direction. Finally, the clearest differences in
the predicted direction emerge in the comparison of the Dysthymics
with the normal extraverts.
For the purposes of further discussion, it will be convenient to
refer to Figure 11, in which the concept co-ordinate values for all sub¬
groups are plotted in the two-dimensional semantic space. The most
striking feature of these graphs is not, as we might have expected, the
differences in concept-origin distances, but rather the differences in
cluster characteristics. It will be observed that the positively-valued
concepts cluster more closely in the case of the normal extraverts than
in that of the normal introverts. This barely noticeable difference
becomes markedly extended, however, in the graphs of the hysterics and
the dysthymics, tempting the speculation that dysthymics over-discriminate
the meanings of positively-valued concepts while hysterics do not dis¬
criminate sufficiently.
The notion that poor discrimination is characteristic of neurosis
HUGHES OWENS 314L-METRIC
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is not new to psychologists who have adopted learning-theory approaches
to psycho-pathology. Bollard and Miller (11), for example, devote
considerable attention to maladaptive discriminations and contend that
successful psychotherapy demands, among other things, the establish¬
ment of good discriminatory responses in the patient. . But why should
the hysterics and dysthymics differ so distinctively in the nature of
their respective deviations from optimal . discriminations? One ex¬
planation is suggested by the work of Eriksen (15) who presents evidence
to indicate that hysterics are strong repressors and that dysthymics,
on the other hand exhibit poor capacity for repressing. If this were
indeed the case, it would be expected that the hysterics would have
greater difficulty in identifying and labelling ambivalent reactions
than would dysthymics. We should expect, therefore that this dif¬
ficulty would be reflected in impoverished verbal discriminations
among concepts that are possibly the source of conflicts.
The apparent over-discrimination among the same concepts by
the dysthymics might be a function of their inability to control
anxiety by repression. It seems reasonable to expect that the constant
brooding and preoccupation with personal inadequacies that characterize
this group would involve a heightened sensitivity to areas of conflict.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that in Figure 11 that there
is a negative correlation between intensity of rating of the positively
valued concepts on Dimension I and intensity of rating on Dimension II
(Spearman's rho = -0.667 with p <hQ5). This correlation suggests that
the greater the conflict elicited by a concept, the greater the "potency"
or significance it has for the dysthymic.
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A second explanation for the unexpected difference in cluster
characteristics between the dysthymics and hysterics invokes the factor
of social desirability that was discussed in Study I. Traub (81, p.54) has
adduced evidence to suggest that the psychological basis of the general
factor of social desirability is extraversion. If this is indeed the
case, it might be argued that the normal extravcrts rated the positively-
valued concepts not in terms of their personal feelings, but rather with a
view to reflecting what would be socially acceptable. Within the frame
of reference provided by the scales, the extraverts might then endorse
all of the positively-valued concepts in approximately the same way.
Adherence to the norm is thus achieved at the price of discrimination.
The effect of neuroticism, on this interpretation, must take the form
of heightening the stereotypy of socially desirable responses. Pre¬
cisely the reverse situation would obtain with the introverts and the
dysthymics.
The crucial difference between these two interpretations is
that the first credits the subjects with honesty in responding to the
Semantic Differential while the second does not. It is clear that the
problem of social desirability will always arise when the individual
is presented with a stimulus situation that is structured in such a




In a comparative study of the Semantic Differential ratings of
normal and neurotic females it was hypothesized that concepts elicit¬
ing favorable reactions in normals would produce less intense reactions
in neurotics. Two groups of female students were designated "Normal"
and "Neurotic" on the basis of Rorschach test performance. A Semantic
Differential Scale consisting of sixteen concepts and twenty scales
was administered to subjects in both groups. A comparison of the mean
Concept-Origin distances revealed that the neurotic groups produced
consistently less favorable ratings of positively evaluated concepts
than did the normal groups. Additional personality test data indicated
that introversion may have been contributed to the obtained differences.
This hypothesis was tested in a second investigation employing the
Maudsley Personality Inventory as a measure of both Neuroticism and
Introversion. The results indicated that both introversion and neuro-
ticism are associated with relatively less intense ratings of positively
valued concepts, but it was observed that in the case of neurotic in¬
troverts (dysthymics), the lower the rating of a concept on the Evalua¬
tive scales, the higher its rating was on the Potency scales. The
effect of this negative correlation was reflected in Concept-Origin
distances. The cluster characteristics exhibited by the various combina¬











The first study reported in this dissertation represented an
attempt to test the validity of an assumed isomorphism between
meaning as a representational mediating process and meaning as
defined by co-ordinate points derived from Semantic Differential
ratings and plotted in the Semantic Space- It was hypothesized
that if this isomorphism were valid, Semantic Differential ratings
of concepts would be subject to the influence of mediated generaliza¬
tion. The results of this study were positive and are interpreted as
constituting partial support for the isomorphism. It is important to
note that the observed mediated generalization does not constitute
proof that meaning is in fact a representational mediating process. In
this respect, the safest conclusion that can be drawn is that differences
and similarities in meaning as defined by Semantic Differential per¬
formance appear to be valid indices of certain internal determinants
of behaviour. Furthermore, the inter-relationships of meanings
revealed in the Semantic Space appear to reflect the organization of
these determinants within the individual.
The second and third studies revealed that the factors of neurosis
(or neuroticism) and introversion are associated with fairly distinc¬
tive patterns of meaning as measured by the Semantic Differential scales.
Borrowing from the findings of the first study it was hypothesized
that ambivalent reactions to positively-valued concepts would produce
shorter concept-origin distances in the Semantic Differential protocols
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of neuotics than in those of normals* This hypothesis was supported
in both the second and third studies. The third study also suggested
that introverts tend to produce shorter concept-origin distances than
do normals.
From all of the studies reported, it is possible to draw a
number of general conclusions concerning the use of the Semantic
Differential in personality research:
1. The Semantic Differential appears to be a valid index
of connotative meaning.
2. The Semantic Differential scales appear to have fairly
stable dimensional characteristics over time and subjects. Since
there is some possibility that these characteristics are partly a
function of the particular concepts rated, it would be necessary to
factorize scales where the degree of concept-scale interaction is
unknown.
3. The Semantic Differential appears to have considerable
promise as a research tool in comparative studies of different clinical
groups.
In each of the studies reported, there arose problems that
have implications for both the theoretical and research aspects of
Osgood's approach to meaning. In this, the concluding section of
the dissertation, it is possible to review these problems in the
light of the findings taken as a whole, and to suggest solutions that
might be tested in subsequent investigations.
The major and recurring difficulty concerns the social desir¬
ability factor in Semantic Differential performance. In the first
study, although it was argued that the findings eould not be satisfactorily
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explained in terms of social desirability, the discussion centred on
the post-treatment analysis. No reference was made to the possibility
that the pre-treatment performance of both the control and experimental
groups could have been influenced by a desire to reflect the socially
accepted meanings of the concepts that formed the subject of the
investigation. From the subsequent studies, however, it became evident
that in simple comparative investigations in which no experimental
treatment was introduced, social desirability constituted a possible
source of variance. It will be recalled that an examination of the
cluster characteristics and the concept-origin distances of the
various groups indicated that if in fact the factor of social desira¬
bility did influence scale ratings, then its influence was largely
restricted to the performance of extraverts. This suggests that
research should be carried out to test this hypothesis. If the
hypothesis is supported, it might be of value to repeat the first
investigation but restricting the sample to introverts. Alternatively,
both extraverts and introverts could be employed if a suitable design
were developed (for example, analysis of covariance).
These suggestions ignore, of course, the challenge posed by
the hypothesized existence of the social desirability factor for
Osgood's approach to meaning. Before passing to a discussion of
the second problem arising from these investigations, therefore,
some consideration should be given to this issue.
Perhaps the simplest way of handling socially desirable
responses within the framework of Osgood's theory of learning is to
treat them as attempts to reduce anxiety produced by ambivalence
of connotative meaning. Let us assume that the individual is
asked to say what a concept means to him. If this concept has
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been previously associated with significates that gave rise to
responses of both approach and avoidance, ambivalence of meaning
will be present. The co-existence of reciprocally antagonistic
meanings would normally mediate, as was suggested in Studies II
and III, a response that constituted a compromise between the
responses that might be mediated by the respective meanings considered
singly. However, if we assume that the individual has either been
punished, or has not been reinforced for producing compromises in
the past, we would predict that this kind of response would be
suppressed, and one of the two responses forming the initial basis
of the conflict would be elicited. Reinforcement of the response
would strengthen the probability of its occurrence. Now since the
constitution of reinforcing agencies (in the shape of people) is
subject to variation it would be expected that the major determinant
of any of the alternative responses (extreme or compromise) would
be the social context in which the concept is presented. This
leads to the prediction that the detection of a socially desirable
response to a concept would be facilitated by manipulating the
situational variables.
There is nothing in this analysis to suggest that a
socially desirable response is a response that does not reflect
a "true" meaning of a concept for the individual. The analysis
implies rather that a socially desirable response is one of a number
of alternative responses elecited by a concept, and what is involved
here is not a sin of commission but one of omission.
The second problem arising from the investigation concerns
the use of personality tests for the purpose of obtaining clinically
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differentiated groups. A review of the findings of Studies II and
III reveals that comparisons of Semantic Differential performance across
groups are of limited value when differentiating criteria (in this
case, the Rorschach and the Maudsley Personality Inventory) do not
correlate highly. This problem is, of course, as old as the history
of personality test development, and there is still no evidence of
an imminent solution. Related to this issue is that posed by the
Foulds and Caine studies cited earlier, namely, the behavioural
variability of individuals assigned to a given personality type on
the basis of test performance. It is obvious that if test-designated
dysthymics behave either like dysthyraics or hysterics, there is
something wrong either with the test or with the behavioural analysis.
In the light of this problem, it is suggested that in comparative
investigations of Semantic Differential performance, both test and
symptom-clusters should be employed as the bases for group differentiation.
In this respect, there need not necessarily be any close degree of
agreement between behavioural analysis and clinical designation by
personality test. Furthermore it is not outwith the bounds of
possibility that the development of a suitable form of the Semantic
Differential may serve not merely as a dependent variable, but also
as an important independent variable in establishing distinctive
clinical groups. It may very well be that this technique may serve
to discriminate between individuals whose sympton-clusters correspond
to their personality types and those in whom such correspondence is
absent.
If further research continues to support the validity of the
Semantic Differential as a quantitative measure of connotative mean¬
ing, this instrument should prove to have considerable value in clinical
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work. The principal advantage lies in the fact that the psychologist
may explore the meaning of any area in the life of the patient or
client without relying exclusively on his own subjective impressions.
It is obvious, of course, that through the operation of a reaction
formation or some other defence-mechanism, the patient may give mis¬
leading responses. This suggests that precautions should be taken to
include scales whose meanings are not obvious but which correlate
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THE D-METHOD OF FACTORING 1
This technique of factoring is essentially equivalent to

































The elements of the matrix are semantic differential ratings by an
individual,, or the mean ratings by a group, scored in the system
+3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, where the size of the number is an index
of rating intensity and the algebraic sign indexes the adjectival
pole. The assumption made is that the matrix defines a space of
k dimensions such that each scale, i has co-ordinates X... . .X..
- - li ji
. . . Xki on the k dimensions. The goal is to find the co-ordinates
on a new set of k dimensions where k is less than k.
For k-dimensional space the following definitions are made (all
summations are over j, where j = 1, 2, . . . , k):
Adapted from Osgood, C.E., Suci, G.J., and Tannenbaum, P.H.







Hare, ct is the co-ordinate of scale i on a dimension I
x ~~
passing through h. To find the co-ordinates on a second dimension II,
orthogonal to I, the distances in k-space must be reduced to their
k-1 values by subtracting from the values their squared components
/ 9
on dimension I. The reduced distances (D ) may be substituted in
equation (5) to find Cjj., the co-ordinate value of scale on
dimension II. The components of the D0q are ct^, and the components
of the Dhi are (c^ - Cq.)




= squared distance between
scale i. and the origin o.
= Dxjh - Xjq) ; the squared distance
between any two scales h and i.
0jvq ; the angle between two vectors where
one vector extends from o to h and the
other from o to i.
In k-dimensional space:
Dhi' = Doh" + Doi " 2DohDoicosehi
2 2 2
D D D








/ \2 r 2 , v 2
<v > " V - <% - V <7>
®oi')2 =Doi2 - and <3>
'Dog ) = Dog " cIrI C9)
O
To find a third dimension, orthogonal to I and II, select a
scale f through which III will pass in k-2 space. Find the distances
D in k-2 space by subtracting their components on I and II and sub¬
stitute in (5) to find the co-ordinates on the third dimension:
(P£i )"• - (Dq£ )2 - (D0j )2 where (10)
CIII- =ii-Li //
-2D cof
(Dfi )2= Dfi2 - (cIf - cIjL)2 - (cIIf - cI1±)2, (11)
2 2 2 2
(Do/) = Doi " cIi " " cIIi^ > and (12>
(Dcf</)2= D0f2 - cifZ - cnf" (13)
This process is continued until the co-ordinates are reduced
to zero or a negligible amount.
In practice it is more convenient to work with sums of cross-
products and squares than with distances. By substitution of the





Similarly we find cxx.; by substituting in (6), and reducing to
cilx = £XjgXji " cIgcIi (15)
./"v 2 - cT 2l8
For a third dimension substitution is made in (10), and
reducing, we find
^ 'xj £Xj "CT .CT. ~ Cjt.CIcm. = J* Jl "If'Ij (16)
-1
f2 " clfz ' cIIf2
